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Abstract 
This dissertation presents an extended organism framework that is directly applicable to the 
study of strategic media skill. The framework posits that it can be helpful in understanding the 
human cognizer’s adaptiveness and success of memory in a digital ecology to consider the 
characteristics of digital memory—the body of rote knowledge and various features of digital 
technology—as part of the human-technology extended organism, rather than an external 
environment on which the cognizer acts. It proposes three major subprocesses of strategic media 
skill: strategic encoding, metacognition, and identifying technological biases. This paper applies 
the framework to the case of offloading cognition to external devices to demonstrate its 
applicability. The extended organism framework, as it stands now, provides a conceptual-
theoretical lens for predicting and explaining findings about strategic media skill, especially from 
an effects tradition, and for asking questions about the cognitive processing underlying strategic 
media skill. Using this perspective and these approaches to empirical investigations, researchers 
should be able to better understand the successes and failures of memory and cognition in a 
digital ecology, currently characterized by near-constant access to external information via 
dynamic and changing digital media devices. The ability to do this will allow media users to 
know the cognitive consequences associated with different actions and strategies and to make 
better decisions about when and how to use digital media to accomplish their goals.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCING STRATEGIC MEDIA SKILL AND THE PROBLEM DOMAIN 
 
In a media ecology where our everyday actions are enabled, constrained, and altered by 
characteristics and affordances of the digital tools available to us at any given time, it is 
surprising that most of the literature on the cognitive consequences of digital media use focuses 
on monolithic claims about whether or not people should rely on these tools to accomplish daily 
tasks. While most researchers identify negative consequences for pervasive technology use on 
recall (Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011; Henkel, 2014), inhibitory control (Dong, DeVito, Du, & 
Cui, 2012), and metacognitive monitoring (Hamilton & Yao, 2018; Ferguson, McLean, & Risko, 
2015; Siler, Hamilton, & Benjamin, 2018; Storm, Stone, & Benjamin, 2017; Stone & Storm, 
2019; Ward, 2013), many aspects of digital media—near-constant internet access, near-limitless 
rote information storage, increasingly reliable connection to other users—can be employed 
strategically to successfully accommodate the demands of intellectual and behavioral goals. 
Indeed, the implications of digital media use can be paradoxical with simultaneous positive and 
negative aspects (van Zoonen & Rice, 2017). Reaping cognitive benefits from digital media 
depends on the media user’s skill in selecting an effective and efficient strategy in different 
situations and their ability to monitor their own learning in pursuit of their goals.  
Many features of technological tools—GPS, data storage, information retrieval—are used 
regularly to accomplish goals in daily life. In such a theoretical perspective, much of what we 
think of as “memory” or “mind” in a digital ecology is the product of an integrative system of 
internal (i.e., in the “brain”) and external (i.e., outside the “brain”) cognitive processes that are 
selected to meet the demands of a particular cognitive task. In light of this nuanced dynamic, 
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there is an emerging issue of conceptualizing the cognition of this extended cognitive system so 
we are able to understand the inherent qualities or liabilities of human memory and cognition in a 
digital ecology.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to present an “extended organism” perspective 
(Chapter 2) for the empirical study of strategic media skill and to offer an approach to studying 
each of three inter-related components that characterize strategic media skill. Using this 
perspective and these approaches to empirical investigations, researchers should be able to better 
understand the successes and failures of memory and cognition in a digital ecology, currently 
characterized by near-constant access to external information via dynamic and changing digital 
media devices. The ability to do this will allow media users to know the cognitive consequences 
associated with different actions and strategies and to make better decisions about when and how 
to use digital media to accomplish their goals. The roots for this perspective on strategic media 
skill lie in the memory‐as‐skilled‐cognition tradition of cognitive psychology (Anderson & 
Milson, 1989; Benjamin, 2007; Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013) and is reminiscent of theories 
on transactive memory (Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 1985). The applicability of this perspective 
is demonstrated through three experiments investigating the influence of cognitive offloading on 
three aspects of strategic media skill. Those are: understanding how various cognitive strategies 
and techniques made possible by digital media influence short- and long- term communicative 
and cognitive goals (Chapter 3), knowing how media users monitor and control the state of 
information available “in the head” and information out in the world in pursuit of their various 
goals (Chapter 4), and understanding how certain characteristics of technology can impair these 
monitoring and control processes (Chapter 5). By studying these interactions, a major goal of 
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this dissertation involves thinking about ways to conceptualize and study digitally-mediated 
cognitive processes and behaviors in increasingly complex media environments. 
This push towards research on media skill is not revolutionary or unprecedented (see 
Hargittai, 2003; Steyaert, 2002; van Deursen & van Dijk, 2010). Given the internet’s ubiquitous 
importance in all domains of life after reaching wide diffusion in the second part of the 1990s 
(Figure 1), communication science researchers have spent a great deal of effort understanding 
and explaining issues of access to and usage of digital media under the interdisciplinary research 
umbrella called the “digital divide.” As the internet became a commonplace in the lives of more 
and more people, however, it became less and less useful to dichotomize those affected by 
unequal access to digital resources between those who have access to the internet and those who 
do not. Instead, researchers implored scholars to “...start looking at differences in how those who 
are online use the medium” (Hargittai, 2001, p. 1) and argued that “because of the growing 
amount of information on the internet and people’s increasing dependence on information, 
internet skills should now be considered as vital assets (van Deursen & van Dijk, 2010, p. 894). 
The overarching message of this dissertation is that understanding the fundamental nature of 
digital media skill and reaching agreement on what are the primary questions that should be 
asked about this phenomenon will require the adoption of a particular theory of mediated 
communication. 
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Figure 1. The percentage of the adult U.S. population using the internet over time, 1995-2019. Data 
source: Pew Research Center. 
 
Strategic Media Skill: A Concept Explication 
 To use digital media effectively, we should do more than create monolithic practices 
surrounding our own media use. Ideas that the internet is ruining our brains or that the internet is 
an omniscient source of knowledge does no service for our ability to think critically and 
reflectively about the consequence of our media use (or non-use) in a given situation. Indeed, 
effective use of digital media is determined by the skillful action of higher-level decision making 
in service of intellectual and behavioral goals. In such a perspective, strategic media skill 
encompasses the myriad ways in which digital media can be strategically employed for the task 
at hand and the degree to which the outcome of these decisions satisfies present and future 
behavioral goals. Imagine, for example, that the goal is to become an expert birder. Because 
expertise and knowledge arise from the acquisition of facts and routines, a person cannot become 
an expert birder by having a hard drive full of bird photographs. Imagine, now, that the goal is to 
remember a friend’s birthday. Making the strategic decision to set up a reminder on a frequently 
accessed device (like a personally-owned smartphone) allows this user to reliably accomplish 
their goal at little cognitive cost. These examples highlight the point that a digital media user 
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needs to know strategies and their consequences to successfully accomplish their goals. Chapter 
2 engages an explicit discussion of the characteristics of a truly skilled media user and these 
characteristics are further explicated in Chapters 3-5. Importantly, empirical research 
demonstrates that our ability to understand the consequences of our decisions about media use is 
highly imperfect. There is quite a lot that we, as humans, do not tend to know about how to 
assess and manage our own knowledge (Nelson & Narens, 1994) and, at the same time, people 
know too little about internet skill to realize they do not know a lot (Dunning, Johnson, 
Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003). To become a truly skilled media user it is necessary to learn the 
general principles and practices that can be applied while making decisions about when and how 
to use digital media to accomplish goals. 
Planned use 
 Ultimately, we know too little about the strategic toolkit a digital media user must have to 
make effective use of digital media by one’s own initiative (Stayaert, 2002; van Deursen & van 
Dijk, 2010). Strategic skill requires a level of digital media mastery beyond the operational and 
formal skills required to become a sophisticated media user, which cannot be gained from long 
or heavy media use (van Deursen & van Dijk, 2010). It is being progressively recognized that 
strategic information skills will become of paramount importance as it is as relevant in relation to 
traditional media (e.g., radio, television) as for new media (Stayaert, 2002). The purpose of this 
explication is to formalize the concept of strategic media skill to facilitate a more consistent 
approach to conceptualization and application of this research area and to make it useful for 
researchers to apply, explore, and build upon. With this goal in mind, there are a few boundary 
conditions of this explication of strategic media skill. First, this explanation is primarily intended 
for those who conduct (or intend to conduct) research on technological mediation, defined as 
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behaviors “...mediated by contemporary technological tools in terms of the psychological, social, 
and behavioral mechanisms...” (Flanagin, 2020, p. 1). In other words, this research favors 
digitally-mediated experiences and behaviors as objects of study, rather than studies of the 
human mind or technological tools themselves. Researchers primarily focused on aspects of 
human cognition should refer to the wealth of research on memory skill (see Benjamin & Ross, 
2008 for review), which gave foundation to the current notion of strategic media skill. Second, 
these arguments of the roles and responsibilities of human memory apply primarily to those who 
are immersed in a digital ecology characterized by frequent, pervasive, and inconspicuous media 
use. This research is not so applicable to those who do not need to rely on digital media to 
accomplish daily tasks, although the number of individuals for whom this discussion does not 
apply is quickly diminishing (Figure 2). The utility of this concept explication should be 
evaluated by its ability to facilitate growth of scientific knowledge that is generalizable from 
observations of media use or misuse and its ability to maintain a coherent reservoir of knowledge 
that is distinct from other types of media-related skills, such as skills related to the characteristics 
of the medium (e.g., operating a smartphone, navigating on the internet).  
 
Figure 2. Frequency of internet usage over time in the adult U.S. population, 2015-2018. Data source: 
Pew Research Center. 
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Literature Review 
 Now that we have formalized the ideas of the concept of strategic media skill at a 
preliminary level, we can begin organizing the scholarly literature that deals with it. Below, I 
discuss three existing concepts that closely relate to strategic media skill. Those are: media 
literacy, memory skill, and internet skill. For each of these three concepts, I delineate the 
conceptual meanings assigned to them, their intended research purpose, and the confusions that 
ambiguities within the literature cause for the understanding and prediction of strategic media 
skill in contemporary human-technology interaction. The end goal for this review of literature is 
to offer an empirical description and modified conceptual definition of strategic media skill that 
alleviates the major constraints posed by prior conceptualizations of the concept. 
Media literacy. One research domain that has been applied to study aspects of media 
skill is media literacy. Media literacy is defined generally as “the ability to access, analyze, 
evaluate and communicate messages in a wide variety of forms” (Aufderheide & Firestone, 
1993) and emphasizes the skills that make use of multimedia features, such as language, moving 
images, music, and sound effects. Many media literacy scholars are concerned with educating 
media users out of a growing concern about potentially negative effects of media use. Media 
literacy scholarship has done a great deal to promote general education (Hobbs & Jensen, 2009; 
Jenkins, Purushotma, Robison, & Weigel, 2006; Kubey, 1998; Sholle & Denski, 1994) and to 
design interventions (Nathanson, 2001; Lawrence & Wozniak, 1989) to train people to avoid 
negative media effects. 
The mega-concept of media literacy was developed to provide a heading for the 
discussion of the necessary skills and abilities required by the population at large to use present-
day information and communication technologies safely. Reasonably so, literature on media 
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literacy grew quickly in size with a wide range of scholarly backgrounds contributing to the 
discussion. As a result, it took on the role of a conceptual conglomerate entangled with a number 
of often unspecified concepts (Potter, 2010). Unpacking the meaning of media literacy and its 
intended research purpose became particularly challenging to researchers (see Potter, 2010 for a 
sampling of definitions). Potter (2010) posed three key issues that confront scholars who study 
media literacy, “What are the media? In terms of media literacy, we must clarify which media we 
mean… What do we mean by literacy? Again there is a wide range of thinking… [And] What 
should be the purpose of media literacy?” (pp. 679-680). Researchers have yet to reach 
consensus on these key issues. For example, Strömbeck (2008) defines media as newspapers, 
radio, and television; Hjarvard (2008) defines media as newspapers, radio, television, and 
interactive media; and Schultz (2004) has a similar list, but replaces interactive media with 
digital media. Some researchers argue that media literacy should be used to contemplate critical 
cultural issues (Alvarado & Boyd-Barrett, 1992), to stimulate media education (Houk & Bogart, 
1974; Sholle & Denski, 1994), or as a topic for psychological inquiry (e.g., Sinatra, 1986; 
Scribner & Cole, 1981). 
Within this literature, however, there is a broad theme concerning citizens’ participation 
in society. As Livingstone (2004) puts it, 
Debates over literacy are, in short, debates about the manner and purposes of public 
participation in society. Without a democratic and critical approach to media literacy, the 
public will be positioned merely as selective receivers, consumers of online information 
and communication. The promise of media literacy, surely, is that it can form part of a 
strategy to reposition the media user - from passive to active, from recipient to 
participant, from consumer to citizen. (pp. 18-20) 
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Media literacy has done a great deal to defend a person’s right to participate in society at 
large and to equip people with the tools to do so effectively. Without a framework for 
negotiating the fundamental nature of the concepts under its expansive umbrella, for 
communicating the major questions, and for reaching consensus on the best research practices 
for giving answers to those questions, it is difficult to determine where and how progress will be 
made in this domain. The goal of this dissertation is to offer a formal framework for asking 
questions and evaluating answers about strategic media skill in a digitally-mediated environment. 
Memory skill. The memory-as-skilled-cognition perspective from cognitive psychology 
holds that beyond the action and interaction of internal memory systems, memory capacity 
reflects the action of higher-level decision making on the inputs to and the outputs from memory 
stores (Benjamin & Ross, 2008). At its core, the notion of memory skill emphasizes the 
important role that strategies and control processes play in memory performance. Benjamin 
(2007) defines memory skill as, “the degree to which people use their strategies to effectively 
allow them to achieve their intellectual goals” (p. 209). A good target on which memory skill 
researchers can focus is, “explaining (and eventually improving) the mnemonic behavior of a 
college student who is studying for and taking an examination” (Nelson & Narens, 1994, p. 6). 
Research on memory skill covers how we choose strategies for a given cognitive task (e.g., 
Goldsmith, Koriat, & Weinberg-Eliezer, 2002), how we successfully regulate and control 
memory in pursuit of a memory goal (e.g., Benjamin & Bird, 2006;  Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996), 
how sophisticated encoding and retrieval strategies can moderate memory deficits (e.g., 
Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2000), and how we effectively monitor our outcomes in order to satisfy 
situational demands (e.g., Thiede, 1999).  
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The interest in memory skill has led to a greater emphasis on the functions of memory in 
real-life contexts, such as eyewitness testimony, preparing for an exam, and reconstructive 
memory. Rather than treating individuals as passive processors, memory skill points to the active 
role of the cognizer in putting memory to use in service of personal goals. Although the concept 
of memory skill plays an important role in progressing a scientific agenda that emphasizes real-
world scenarios, it does less for forwarding questions regarding processes of cognitive and 
communicative change to which technologies are closely linked. Whereas memory skill scholars 
study basic cognitive processes that drive action, media skill scholars emphasize technology-
enabled processes and attributes that demonstrate cause. Whereas memory scholars build 
theories about a relatively stable—yet vastly complex—human memory systems, media scholars 
must first build theories that are able to accommodate rapid technological change and an ever-
changing object of study. If we are to study the skilled use of media, we will need to incorporate 
a framework that is sensitive to the complex and variable nature of media change. 
Strategic internet skill. As the internet continues to play a large and increasing role in 
our daily routine, the importance of internet skills for participation in labor, education, and social 
contacts has also increased (Steyaert, 2002). In response, van Deursen and van Dijk (2010) 
proposed a four-component framework for the systematic study of technical and content aspects 
of internet skill. Technical skills consist of operational skills, which include the basic skills to 
operate an internet browser, and formal skills, which include the ability to navigate and orient 
oneself with the internet’s hypermedia structure. Content skills consist of information skills, 
which include the ability to search, select, and evaluate online information, and strategic skills, 
which include the capacity to use the internet to achieve a particular goal (van Deursen & van 
Dijk, 2010).  
11 
Strategic internet skill, the most relevant component to the explication of strategic media 
skill, is described as a process concept that consists of four steps in making effective use of the 
internet. The procedure begins with goal orientation and the final step is obtaining the benefits of 
making the optimal decision. Van Deursen and van Dijk (2010) empirically define strategic 
internet skills as: 
Taking advantage of the Internet by, 
● developing an orientation towards a particular goal,  
● taking the right action to reach this goal, 
● making the right decision to reach this goal, and  
● gaining the benefits resulting from this goal. (pp. 898-899) 
The definition of strategic internet skill is derived from traditional decision-making 
approaches that emphasize procedures through which optimal solutions are reached (Miller, 
2008). Because selecting an optimal decision requires a base of knowledge accumulated through 
years of complex learning (van Deursen & van Dijk, 2015), levels of strategic internet skills 
leave much room for improvement. A longitudinal analysis conducted among the Dutch 
population indicate that while levels of operational and formal internet skills are increasing, 
likely due to policy initiatives aimed at improving basic skills among specific target populations 
like the elderly (van Deursen & van Dijk, 2015), levels of information and strategic skills have 
seen only a very small increase. Of the variables that influence these skills, education is the most 
important (van Deursen & van Diepen, 2013). Unlike formal and operational skills that can be 
acquired by simply using the internet, information and strategic skills put greater stress on one’s 
cognitive abilities, and therefore, are a greater challenge for training programmes (van Deursen 
& van Dijk, 2015). Indeed, strategic internet skill incorporates aspects of operational, formal, and 
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information skill as means to reach a particular personal or professional goal by one’s own 
initiative. 
This concept of strategic internet skill is well-suited for driving empirical questions 
related to technical mediation, at least as it relates to the internet, and for harboring the 
accumulated knowledge on strategic skill that is unique from other distinct components of the 
internet skill framework. Still, posing a boundary condition around the internet, limits its 
applicability to experiences that are cross-mediated—by this, I mean experiences that cannot be 
simply associated with a given medium, such as the internet. Just like we no longer have to go to 
our television set to watch live video, we no longer have to turn on our computer to access 
internet information. Our smartphones and smartwatches can provide us internet content nearly 
anytime and anywhere; and smart speakers and chatbots continuously update their knowledge to 
offer assistance fine-tuned to our daily lives. These devices are multi-purpose platforms that 
provide a variety of media and communication experiences, and critically, a high propensity for 
modifications and other changes over time. Going forth, media researchers will need to shift their 
focus from novel platforms of communication to novel processes of communicative change that 
are entangled within a complex digital ecology. 
Modified Conceptualization 
Based on the literature review, it is clear that operational definitions of strategic media 
skill revolve around measuring the extent to which optimal solutions are reached. Strategic 
media skill involves taking the right action in service of intellectual and behavioral goals in the 
face of technology-related biases that can impair judgments.  
 In the current view of strategic media skill, decision-making is an entirely rational 
process. The basic operational procedures are as follows. First, media users identify an 
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intellectual or behavioral goal that necessitates a decision. The media user then considers all 
characteristics of their environment which might be relevant to their decision (e.g., which 
technologies are available? How could they serve me?). Next, the media user develops a set of 
strategy options and evaluates them according to a set of criteria for decision effectiveness. The 
process concludes when the media user identifies an optimal decision and can begin 
implementation. Entangled within these general procedures are a host of processes and biases 
produced by a multi-faceted relational structure between technologies and the user, which enable 
and constrain potential outcomes. The argument here is that unraveling those technology-
produced processes and biases will bring users one step closer toward becoming maximally 
effective as digital media users. 
 Empirical description. Consider, as an empirical example, the case of a journalist 
completing a news report to be published online. Their short-term goal is to write a report so that 
all of the facts are correct. Now that a goal has been identified, we can consider characteristics of 
the environment that might be relevant to goal completion. Assume in this scenario that the 
journalist’s reliability in verifying the veracity of factual information is 90.00% (they catch 9 of 
10 errors). The reliability of the information that this journalist uses to write the report is 70.00% 
(7 of 10 facts are correct). Therefore, the overall reliability of this article will likely be 97.00%. 
A fact-checking software is installed on the journalist’s computer with a reliability of 80%. The 
assumption is that it will catch 8 out of 10 errors that the journalist fails to catch. So, the 
reliability of the article should now be 99.40%.  
Now, the journalist can develop a set of strategy options, such as using the software to 
periodically check facts (saving time and cognitive energy) or writing the article while self-
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checking facts and then running the fact-checking software at the end (using more time and 
cognitive energy).  
Ideally, this would lead to a profitable trade off. If the journalist has the goal of producing 
reports with near perfect accuracy, then adding this software would allow the journalist to 
optimize their goal of writing a factual report. Instead, after the journalist made a decision about 
how to write the report the reliability of the article dropped to 94.00%. Why? This is because the 
journalist decided to offload responsibility for fact checking to what they considered a reliable 
software. From this scenario, we see that one benefit of offloading responsibility is that it allows 
the opportunity for humans to increase access to useful information (e.g., relatively correct facts) 
while decreasing the cost of doing so (e.g., time spent fact-checking). Still, the journalist can 
only take advantage of the technologies available to them if they understand and overcome new 
biases of technology use. Unfortunately, the journalist did not make optimal decisions to 
accomplish their goal because they incorrectly inferred that it is not necessary for them to fact-
check while the computer does not have the inferencing abilities to surmount the journalist’s 
role. Optimally, the journalist would have appropriate knowledge of what the machine was good 
at (e.g., comparing content from a vast number of online sources) and then use fact-checking 
strategies that were outside the scope of the machine’s abilities (e.g., considering the subtext of 
the article). This scenario provides context for understanding prominent questions that need 
answers in this domain. For example: which decisions about encoding would have led to a more 
profitable trade-off? What factors constrained this media user’s ability to make a better decision 
about their media use? (See Appendix A for two complete strategic media skill scenarios).  
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Conceptual Definition 
So far, it has been demonstrated that conceptions of strategic media skill have different 
roots, which have all made valuable improvements in this topic domain. The goal here is to 
present a conceptual definition of strategic media skill that alleviates some of the major 
constraints posed by adjacent concepts in this empirical domain. Based on the literature review, a 
definition of strategic media skill should include the following major dimensions: focus on 
optimal decisions, central to a mediated environment, conducive to empirical exploration in 
media scholarship.  
Strategic media skill is a process concept describing the higher-level decisions a media 
user makes about when and how to use digital media in pursuit of their intellectual and 
behavioral goals. Put plainly, strategic media skill is “the careful action of high-level decision 
making about simple or complex media use employed in service of intellectual or behavioral 
goals.”  
To say that media skill is strategic means we are interested in goal attainment. This point 
is key to understanding the major purpose of strategic media skill research. Not all research that 
involves cognitive aspects of media fall under the umbrella of strategic media skill. Instead, 
researchers who might contribute to strategic media skill are those who seek to understand how a 
person can effectively use digital media to accomplish their personal goals and are privy to the 
particular nature of these digitally-mediated interactions that threaten effective use of these tools. 
In this sense, strategic skills are flexible and changing with respect to contexts and goals. 
Educating media users on simply how to use tools does no service to dynamic, flexible, and 
changing modes of use. What if there is a system update? What if connection is lost? A strategic 
media user is one who is able to reflect upon the material features available to them, their 
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personal intellectual and technical abilities, and the situated nature of use to understand the best 
course of action for accomplishing their goals. To say that strategic skill involves digital media, 
means we are interested in cognitive tasks of people in a mediated environment. It does not mean 
that it is necessary to employ technologies in every context where they are available. Indeed, 
there are several cases where the appropriate decision is to rely on non-digital tools or internal 
capacities alone. But, using the term strategic media skill is to acknowledge that these cognitive 
decisions are made with respect to a dynamic media environment. To say that we are interested 
in skill is to say that we are interested in the ability to carry out a task with determined results. 
This requires a level of reflexivity on the part of the media user that may often feel unnatural, but 
nonetheless, is critical to the skilled use of media in today’s complex digital environment. 
As will be demonstrated later in this dissertation, the terms that are used to operationalize 
and empirically describe strategic media skill—internal and external memory, strategic encoding 
and retrieval, metacognition, technological biases—are relative to an individual human, which is 
the conventional unit of analysis in social science. Although we cannot test the process that 
strategic media skill depicts directly, theorized processes may be tested (McLeod & Pan, 2005). 
The following chapter poses a lens for understanding the ontological nature of strategic media 
skill and for developing operational procedures to examine processes and concepts most relevant 
to the skilled use of digital media.  
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Chapter 2 
THE EXTENDED ORGANISM PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter is adapted from a journal article published as: 
Hamilton, K. A., & Benjamin, A. S. (2019). The human-machine extended organism: New roles and 
responsibilities of human cognition in a digital ecology. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and 
Cognition, 8(1), 40-45. 
 
How should researchers investigate strategic media skill? This chapter constitutes one 
answer to that question.  
 The ready availability of digital media means that our knowledge and memory exist in a 
transactional relationship with our devices. Given that many strategies for accomplishing a 
personal goal involve integrated use of external and internal cognitive processes, media users 
face a new coordination demand of discerning when and how to use external resources to 
accomplish their personal goals. Although digital media offer a way to extend the faculties of our 
human cognitive capacities, it introduces into our affairs novel and unfamiliar phenomena. 
Whereas our internal memory system has enormous capacities to self-organize and reorganize 
(Hunt & McDaniel, 1993), for example, our external memory systems require a media user to 
adopt new strategies and routines that will allow external information to be rendered available in 
the future. As digital media continue to play a large and increasing role in supporting human 
memory, concepts and theories in the field of mediated communication have opportunities to 
play an instrumental part in unraveling the fundamental nature of technology-mediated 
cognition. 
Shortcomings of Prior Media Research 
 There are three shortcomings of previous media research that, under this current view, 
constrain scientific progress on strategic media skill. These shortcomings are interrelated and 
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each tends to give rise to the next. What follows this discussion of shortcomings of prior media 
research is an approach to conceptualizing and studying aspects of strategic media skill that 
alleviates constraints posed by these shortcomings. I argue that researchers investigating aspects 
of strategic media skill should assess the extent to which any guiding theory upholds these 
shortcomings before applying the theory to the study of strategic media skill.  
First Shortcoming: Investigating medium X on outcome Y. Within the practice of 
theorizing of media, particularly the effects tradition, our major theories in media research have 
been strongly influenced by the media—as in, technological objects or outlets used to store and 
deliver information—of the era. The advent of the television gave us theories such as agenda-
setting and cultivation theory. The advent of the computer gave us the field of computer-
mediated communication (CMC) and human-computer interactions. The advent of the internet 
and social networking sites are currently raising new and important questions within the field. 
The constant shift in our objects of study reflect a major limitation of our dominant paradigm. In 
articulating the major dilemmas within the field of computer-mediated communication, Walther 
(2011) explains, “New CMC platforms and applications force us to ask how well the theories and 
approaches we know can cover rapid developments and significant changes in technological 
attributes. Questions are frequently raised about the utility of theories that were developed when 
CMC was just plain text, now that variants include free video conferencing and multimodal 
social networking sites…” 
When media researchers segment their thoughts around specific media or design studies 
wherein the object is treated, and subsequently studied, as a whole (e.g., effects of internet on 
outcome Y), we limit our understanding of the empirical reality of complex media phenomena. 
Because our inferences in a traditional media effects paradigm are limited to our tested samples, 
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investigations concerned with the effects of medium X on outcome Y inevitably constrain their 
generalizations to that particular medium. In other words, the dilemma here is that researchers 
study media as agents of change, but use a general notion of medium, which is inevitably limited 
to the empirical context. This appears to be in part due to the fact that practices are processes of 
media use and that when the researcher tries to theorize this involves reification of the process, 
freezing it into a particular context. This presents a particular dilemma for a field whose guiding 
questions are driven by understanding the fundamental nature of change with a technological 
cause. If media researchers continue to generate typologies without rooting them in a broader 
context of media use, it will be difficult for our research to keep up with routine technological 
improvements and innovations. A guiding framework for studying strategic media skill will need 
to provide a solution that alleviates constraints posed by our rapidly changing object of study 
(i.e., media). 
Second Shortcoming: Overemphasis on Independent Systems. Traditionally, research 
on strategic media skill involves an analysis of the qualities of some medium (e.g., the internet, 
smartphones): examining the various ways that technology features enable, constrain, and alter 
memory behavior. Henkel (2014), for example, showed that individuals who took photos of 
objects during a museum tour, remembered fewer objects and fewer details about the objects 
than when they observed objects without taking pictures of them. Sparrow and colleagues (2011) 
found that people have lower rates of recall for information they believed would be accessible in 
the future compared to information they believe would be erased—a phenomenon coined the 
Google Effect. In both of these examples, we see an assumption being made that treats humans 
and the tools they use to accomplish their personal goals as separable, whereby the cognitive 
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consequences of technology on human cognition are evaluated when individuals unknowingly 
lose access to their tools, which occurs much less frequently in our current digital ecology. 
Understanding the individual constituents of human-technology partnerships is 
insufficient to understand fully the processes and behaviors of the cognizer in a digital ecology. 
Treating human and technology as independent systems denies two important facts about the 
partnership. First is the fact that the ready availability of technology changes, and should change, 
exactly what humans feel they need to know in order to reach their goals effectively. For 
example, if we have reliable access to the internet, why should we try to remember birthdays or 
directions? Certainly, it can do better than we can, and what is gained by keeping that 
information in our own heads? Second, it denies the fact that many qualities of present-day 
humans and technologies are shaped by the other. Outsourcing rote knowledge to the internet 
does not, despite popular opinion, make humans stupid. And the internet is not in any sense 
“omniscient.” Certainly, it is a record of known facts, queries, objects, and writings. But it is also 
a collection of our misgivings, biases, secrets, and attempts to distort. The internet does not seek 
to establish coherence across its knowledge base, making it vulnerable to gaps and biases in our 
knowledge (e.g., Vanian, 2018) and to attempts to weaponize the appearance of fact in service of 
political, social, or personal goals (e.g., Boffey, 2018). In contrast, because human cognition 
prioritizes inference over information, it seeks coherence and suffers from poor memory for rote 
knowledge as a consequence. A guiding framework for studying strategic media skill will need 
to take a stance on how to approach the complex dynamic between humans and their devices that 
reflects ecologically valid contexts of use. 
Third Shortcoming: Neglecting the Paradoxes of Transactive Media Use. Neglecting 
the transactive nature of our relationship with our media devices is to neglect the empirical 
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reality of our time. To study strategic media skill, researchers must appreciate, if not 
acknowledge, two assumptions. First is the assumption that strategic media users must commit to 
an ongoing process to understand, manage, make sense of, cope with, and use one or more digital 
media. Second, is the assumption that digital media, in turn, come to manage, control, and affect 
media users and their decisions (Rice, Hagen, & Zamanzadeh, 2018). For example, users can 
take advantage of reliable information storage services (e.g., Cloud-based services) to the extent 
that the information is retrievable. What if internet connection is lost when you need some 
digitally-stored information? What if you cannot recall where you placed external information 
within your digital organizational structure? The more we choose to store information on our 
personal digital devices, the more we come to rely on our devices to complete future tasks. We 
cannot truly understand human decisions and actions until we understand how the simple use of 
digital media alters subsequent decision-making processes. A guiding framework for studying 
strategic media skill will need to accommodate the transactive qualities of human-technology 
partnerships. 
Extended Organism Framework: Philosophy Overview 
I start from the position that part of using memory effectively involves knowing how to 
increase access to useful information, while decreasing the cost of doing so (Anderson & Milson, 
1989; Benjamin, 2007; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Simon, 1996). Many technology-enabled 
offloading strategies, like storing contacts, finding directions, and searching the internet, are 
regularly employed in service of more efficient memory. Much of what we think of as human 
memory, or more broadly of mind, in a digital ecology is in fact the product of an integrative 
system of internal (i.e., “inside” the brain) and external (i.e., “outside” the brain) cognitive 
processes that are selected to meet the demands of a particular cognitive task. In such a 
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theoretical perspective, the ability to effectively integrate internal and external processes to guide 
decisions is the critical feature of a successful cognitive agent. 
High-tech external memory devices (e.g., computers, smartphones, internet) are able to 
perform some cognitive tasks that once could only be accomplished by humans. Certain features 
of these external devices, like their vastness, depth, and longevity, unequivocally outperform 
human memory, which is fallible in many ways (Schacter, 2001). As a consequence, the use of 
technology has become a habit of daily life. In a recent survey study, Finley, Naaz, and Goh 
(2018) summarized the ways in which external memory is seen as augmenting human capability 
in the early twenty-first century. Notably, 74% of participants indicated that external memory 
works better for semantic purposes, such as storing passwords, phone numbers, dates, 
appointments, email addresses, physical addresses, directions, “stone-cold facts,” quotes, names, 
recipes, financial information, numbers, formulas, and lists. This is especially the case for 
information that is infrequently used, complex, boring, or vast. For such information, technology 
plays a large and increasing role in supporting human cognition. 
The ecological strengths of human cognition, on the other hand, are related to the ability 
to effortlessly draw inferences from data. This includes the development of categories: humans 
easily and spontaneously learn natural categories like “dogs” and social categories like “friends” 
from experience. In contrast, only recently have advances in machine learning progressed to the 
point where machines can classify complex stimuli that humans do routinely (in tasks like speech 
perception and object recognition; LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015). Humans also communicate, 
manipulate, and conceptualize problems with symbols—a strength that underlies our ability to 
solve complex problems (Anderson & Bower, 1973). Unlike machines, people are able to apply 
abstract rules in novel but appropriate situations (e.g., Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992), 
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understand and learn complex language (e.g., Kim, Pinker, Prince, & Prasada, 1991), and 
express and use metacognitive knowledge to one another in service of identifying individuals 
suited towards solving those problems (Bennett, Benjamin, Mistry, & Steyvers, 2014). The 
uniquely human capability to go beyond the information presented to infer what is “true” of the 
world is our strength in a digital ecology. 
Extended Organism Metaphor 
It can be helpful in understanding the human cognizer’s adaptiveness and success of 
memory in a digital ecology to consider the characteristics of digital memory—the body of rote 
knowledge and various features of digital technology—as part of the human-technology 
extended organism, rather than an external environment on which the cognizer acts. Similar to 
the idea of swarm cognition in termites (Turner, 2011). In essence, cognition itself is viewed as a 
communicative phenomenon, whereby the basic units of the social system (e.g., technological 
features, human abilities, context of use) are viewed together as a single entity: a superorganism. 
The extended organism contains a dynamic body of knowledge that reacts and self-regulates in a 
changing environment and with changing goals. Our access to digital memory shapes the manner 
in which we achieve our intellectual goals and, simultaneously, our queries and contributions to 
digital memory shape the nature of the information it possesses and provides to others.  
To understand how humans achieve intellectual goals in a digital world, one has to 
understand the process and abilities of the human-technology extended organism within its 
broader environment. A good working analogy is swarm cognition in termites. It can be helpful 
in understanding the termite’s adaptiveness and success in a variety of environments to consider 
the structure and geometry of the termite mound—tunnels made of varying materials and food 
caches—as part of the extended termite, rather than an external environment on which the 
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termite acts (Turner, 2011). The termite mound is a dynamic body of knowledge that reacts and 
self-regulates in a changing environment and with changing goals. The complex behaviors of this 
extended organism emerge from its simple constituents, yet understanding these constituents 
alone does not suffice to understand the swarm’s cognitive abilities.  
The extended organism metaphor is reminiscent of studies on transactive memory 
systems. The psychological theory of transactive memory explains how a person can become 
dependent on others to make the process of storing and retrieving information more efficient 
(Wegner, 1987). In a problem-solving task, Wegner, Giuliano, and Hertel (1985) showed that 
close dyads tend to adopt an integrated strategy for resolving discrepancies between individual 
responses. These results support the notion that transactive communication processes tend to 
develop among close dyads, which form a unique “group-mind.” In general, theories of 
transactive memory allow us to understand aspects of the unique group-mind that develops in 
various systems (Wegner, 1987). Like theories of transactive memory, the extended organism 
metaphor is intended to allow researchers and media users to understand aspects of the unique 
group-mind that develops within human-technology relational structures. Adopting an extended 
organism perspective is to acknowledge that in order to understand the full cognitive 
consequences of living in today’s digitally-mediated environment, we should understand the 
human and their digital media together as an extended organism that has capacities and risks 
beyond the reach of either alone. 
If the concept of an extended organism in human-technology interactions has validity, we 
should expect this unit to perform cognitive tasks at the “superorganismal” scale. Indeed, the 
cognitive powers of the extended organism has been demonstrated in empirical settings. When 
learners are told that to-be-learned information will be stored on a computer for later, they show 
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lower rates of recall for that information (Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011). One might draw the 
conclusion that Google is changing the way we think—and not for the better. Yet, if we consider 
the cognitive context in which this memory behavior is situated and evaluate memory as an 
optimization to the information-retrieval task that the human-technology extended organism 
faces, we see that in fact the decision to outsource (some) memory is an adaptive one. If we trust 
that semantic information will be accessible in the future and unlikely to be needed under 
circumstances in which the internet is not available, there is no need to fully encode it into our 
internal memory, which is limited in capacity and precision. In experiments in which users have 
access to information saved in external memory devices, they outperform users who are forced to 
rely on their own memory (e.g., Storm & Stone, 2014). Here we see that the complex behaviors 
of this extended organism emerge from its simple constituents, yet understanding these 
constituents alone does not suffice to understand the organism’s cognitive abilities and the 
vulnerabilities that threaten the successful use of memory. 
Toward a Theory of Strategic Media Skill 
Thus far, we have discussed the fundamental nature of our human-technology 
interactions under contexts relevant to strategic media skill and proposed the extended organism 
perspective as a specific way of observing the digital world. The purpose of this section is to 
reach shared agreement on what are the primary questions that should be asked about our topic 
domain of strategic media skill. To do so, I refer back to our modified definition of strategic 
media skill, which is “the careful action of high-level decision making about simple or complex 
media use employed in service of intellectual or behavioral goals.” Humans making decisions 
about technology use in an extended cognitive system must not only know how to operate the 
tools in their extended system, but they must also know whether their decision is appropriate for 
26 
the demands of the task. Indeed, knowing how to manage one’s own extended cognitive system 
has become an important survival tool. This general notion that our complex and rapidly 
evolving digital environment poses a new demand on a person to self-initiate and self-manage 
learning is readily apparent in cognitive science research, yet “for reasons that are not entirely 
clear, our intuitions and introspections appear to be unreliable as a guide to how we should 
manage our own learning activities” (Bjork et al., 2013, p. 419). Similar to strategic media skill, 
intuitions about our own learning does not come naturally and it is necessary to develop 
principles and practices to guide more effective decision-making surrounding our learning 
activities.  
The following principles that describe the fundamental components of strategic media 
skill are adapted from cognitive psychology research regarding how to become sophisticated as a 
learner (Bjork et al., 2013), which is based on decades of learning literature. These general 
principles detailing what a person would need to know in order to become truly skilled as a 
media user can be used to guide important empirical questions on strategic media skill.  
Becoming Skilled as a Media User 
Becoming truly effective as a digital media user in an extended cognitive system entails, 
(a) recognizing key aspects of the functional architecture that characterizes the symbiosis 
between humans and digital media; (b) understanding how various cognitive strategies and 
techniques made possible by digital media influence short- and long- term communicative and 
cognitive goals; (c) knowing how media users monitor and control the state of information 
available “in the head” and information out in the world in pursuit of their various goals; and (d) 
understanding how certain characteristics of technology can impair these monitoring and control 
processes.  
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Strategic media skill, in this framework, is conceived of as a set of simultaneously 
occurring subprocesses that people perform and that determine sophisticated media use. This 
framework proposes three major subprocesses of strategic media skill: strategic encoding 
(Principle B), metacognition (Principle C), and identifying technological biases (Principle D), 
which serve two critical purposes. First, it serves as a means to present variables that represent 
strategic media skill in ways that are observable and measurable. Although the process of 
strategic media skill cannot be directly tested, hypotheses about the specific outcomes derived 
from a theoretical process can be tested (McLeod & Pan, 2005). Second, taking an approach that 
emphasizes core processes of interest over particular tasks, tools, or features that exhibit such 
processes facilitate the identification and development of research that emphasizes aspects of 
technology-mediated human behavior enduring across technologies (Flanagin, 2020) and also 
should serve as a bridge between memory research and research in attention and perception 
(Jacoby, 1991) and research in decision making (Nelson & Narens, 1994). This will hopefully 
allow future researchers to evaluate strategic media skill using a systematic approach to provide 
unique insight that will contribute to broader theories.  
Still, before an individual can employ these subprocesses for more efficient media use, 
they must first understand the major peculiarities of the functional nature of human cognition, 
digital media, and their interactions (Principle A). This involves understanding the key ways that 
humans and technology differ. It is helpful to know, for example, that while certain features of 
technology like its vastness and longevity easily outperform human memory, our devices are 
currently unable perform the uniquely human feat of going beyond the information presented to 
infer what is “true” of the world, such as forgetting out-of-date information or solving complex 
problems. It is also helpful to know using the internet as a repository of our memories prevents 
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us from using adaptive qualities of our memory, such as those that inoculate us against 
misinformation (e.g., Johnson & Raye, 1981) or allow us to develop expertise. A central premise 
of this paper has been that the strength of human cognition is the ability to draw inferences from 
data and solve problems that are beyond the capabilities of digital memory. Ironically, the ability 
for cognizers to accomplish the uniquely human feat of developing expertise, exercising 
creativity, synthesizing information, and generating new ideas is dependent upon having 
available the facts and routines that underlie these enterprises. One cannot become an expert 
birder by having a hard drive full of bird photographs. Generalization comes from internalized 
knowledge. Although organization is a key factor for effective memory in an extended cognitive 
system, knowing simply how to access external information does not support the generalization 
of knowledge and development of expertise in the same way. A critical role of the cognizer in a 
digital ecology is the ability to make careful decisions about when we are best served by storing 
information internally for future inference, even when that storage is error-prone or difficult. 
Again, we see how the consequences of outsourcing retrieval are beyond the understanding of 
simple constituents. To be maximally effective as a media user necessitates a commitment to 
understanding these important peculiarities of our human-technology cognitive architecture. 
An Example: Cognitive Offloading 
The aforementioned process-oriented approach lends itself to studying many other 
aspects of strategic media skill—to do so requires only that the research conceptualizes their 
variables in terms of one of three major subprocesses. In the following chapters, I specifically 
apply the extended organism framework of strategic media skill to the case of offloading 
cognition to an external device. Although offloading strategies have existed for centuries (e.g., 
reading encyclopedias, writing with pen and paper, finger counting), the concept was not 
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formalized until 2016 when cognitive scientists Risko and Gilbert defined cognitive offloading 
as “the use of physical action to alter the information processing requirements of a task so as to 
reduce cognitive demand” (p. 676). Examples of offloading include writing information on a 
sticky note, using a GPS to find directions, or searching for information online. In this sense, 
cognitive offloading is an encoding strategy where people choose to share responsibility for a 
cognitive task with some external source in order to decrease effort and increase memory 
performance.  
I explore and empirically demonstrate the three major subprocesses that characterize 
strategic media skill—strategic encoding, metacognition, and technological biases—within the 
experimental context of offloading cognition by searching for answers to general-information 
trivia questions. According to Chaffee (1996), “a theory should presumably produce reliable 
results in the real world, or we should not have much use for it” (p. 17). Google processes over 
40,000 search queries every second, which translates to over 3.5 billion searches per day 
(Internet Live Stats, 2020). Recent empirical research has noted several behavioral outcomes 
associated with internet search. For example, Storm, Stone, and Benjamin (2017) found that 
having unfettered access to the internet increases future use of the internet to access other 
information, and Ferguson and colleagues (2015) found that using the internet can decrease our 
willingness to rely on internal memory. We are increasingly facing situations that allow us to 
offload internal cognition, which may have downstream effects on our subsequent memory and 
metacognitions (Risko & Gilbert, 2016).  
Each chapter that follows includes an explication and an experiment that demonstrates 
each of the three subprocesses that characterizes strategic media skill under an extended 
organism perspective. The extended organism framework, as it stands now, provides a 
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conceptual-theoretical lens for predicting and explaining findings about strategic media skill, 
especially from an effects tradition, and for asking questions about the cognitive processing 
underlying strategic media skill. Conceptualizing components of strategic media skill in terms of 
(a) encoding strategies that influence behavioral goals, (b) monitoring and controlling of 
learning, and (c) identifying technological biases should prove useful both to researchers and 
media users by increasing our understanding of the major determinants of sophisticated media 
use. Questions about cognitive offloading, while prominent in our current literature, only 
illustrate one type of question to be explored in this domain. In the conclusion section, I 
summarize some other questions that would benefit from further investigation. 
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Chapter 3 
STRATEGIC ENCODING  
This empirical study in this chapter is an experiment for a journal article to be published as: 
Hamilton, K. A.*, Siler, S.* & Benjamin, A. S. (In Progress). Have you tried Googling it? When internet 
search enhances memory.   
 
Strategic Encoding: A Concept Explication 
The first subprocess associated with more sophisticated media use is knowing how 
various cognitive strategies and techniques made possible by digital media influence short- and 
long- term communicative and cognitive goals. 
 People cannot possibly store all perceivable information in mind and must make several 
decisions, such as how to limit their intake of material and how to store information to meet the 
demands of present or future memory goals. During this general process of encoding, the 
observer engages in a number of operations, such as perceiving, attending to, and working with 
internal and external events, with the ultimate goal of converting useful information into a 
construct that can later be used to adaptively guide behavior (Davachi & Dobbins, 2008). 
Strategic encoding refers to the skillful selection of an encoding strategy. The number of 
encoding strategies available in a given context of memory use are diverse and varied.  
Generally, when we think of the strategies we use to encode information, we think of 
strategies that will help convert information that can be stored within the brain (internal 
memory). For example, you might think of the time you came up with a useful mnemonic to 
memorize a definition, or the time you visualized numbers in your head to memorize a password. 
However, encoding strategies can also be those that help convert information to be stored outside 
the brain (external memory). For example, you might use a password manager on your personal 
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device to store passwords that are important but infrequently used, or you might bookmark 
webpages you think might be useful in the future. All of these examples reveal the way people 
efficiently and effectively employ encoding strategies to enhance memory by selecting strategies 
that are appropriate to the demands of the material (e.g., you probably wouldn’t want to 
memorize a URL) and the goal at hand (e.g., you probably don’t need to store passwords used on 
a daily basis). There are other situations, however, that reveal failures to encode effectively. For 
example, when preparing for a test, you may choose to read your notes line-by-line, assess your 
familiarity with the material as an indication that the information is known, and then find that 
you are not able to recall that content at the time of the test (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975). You 
might prepare for a presentation by writing important points to cover in the notes section of your 
slides and then find that the projector you must use can only mirror content on your screen. We 
can see from these examples that our ability to accomplish intellectual goals like taking tests or 
giving presentations are not always based on a general capacity to remember, but rather, are a 
product of the strategic decisions we make during encoding. 
There are limiting conditions on this generality, however. For example, Mueller and 
Oppenheimer (2014) found that students who took notes on laptops performed worse when 
tested on their conceptual knowledge of the information than students who took notes longhand. 
Structural features of media such as those related to the way information is displayed to the user 
or the way in which can be used play a role in how and how well that information is 
remembered. Similarly, in an ad viewing task, Sundar, Narayan, Obregon, and Uppal (1998) 
found that advertisements displayed in print format were better recognized than advertisements 
displayed in online format. Searching the Internet has also been associated with lower accuracy 
in recalling information as compared to traditional book searching (Dong & Potenza, 2015). 
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Such aspects of media also influence downstream judgments and decisions related to the 
information. For example, Yang and Roskos-Ewoldsen (2007) found that the way that products 
are placed within a movie not only influence recognition of the target brand, but also reported 
attitudes toward the brand. The important lesson from this combined evidence is that one media 
user may be more likely to recall information when needed compared to another media user 
because of their ability to select appropriate encoding strategies for the task at hand, rather than 
because they have superior memory; but also, features and affordances of the media while 
making decisions about encoding will influence how and how well information is encoded.  
Many strategic encoding experiments evaluate cognitive offloading in the context of a 
search manipulation. This manipulation often consists of an orienting instruction of internal 
search (memory retrieval) versus external search (internet/computer retrieval). The intent is to 
induce a difference in encoding procedures to evaluate the degree to which memory, usually 
measured as proportion correct on a final test, reflects that difference. The general expectation is 
that memory for previously viewed information will be worse in the external memory than 
internal memory conditions. This finding reflects a prominent learning theory that self-produced 
information is better remembered than information that is presented and passively read (Jacoby, 
1978; McKinley, Brown-Schmidt, & Benjamin, 2017; Slamecka & Graf, 1978).  
The experiment presented in this chapter is a concrete application of empirical research 
on strategic encoding that is evaluated through an extended organism perspective. Specifically, I 
test the hypothesis that using an internet search engine to search for answers to general-
information questions will lead to better recall of those answers compared to memory retrieval. 
Contrary to prior research, I start from the position that the use of technology requires 
considerable cognitive planning and may in some cases have beneficial consequences for 
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memory. Many characteristics of effective learning—deep encoding, cognitive elaboration, and 
error generation—are employed in the generation of effective cues for searching the Internet. In 
addition, the evaluation processes involved in selecting among the literally millions of outcomes 
of an Internet search are also known to promote learning (Watanabe, 2001). This 
conceptualization turns conventional understanding on its head: searching the Internet may, 
under certain conditions, set the stage for excellent memory for searched information. The 
overarching goal is to demonstrate how an extended organism lens allows researchers to predict 
and explain contradictory findings relevant to strategic media skill. 
Hamilton*, Siler*, & Benjamin: Memory Performance  
For the current study, we designed a within-subjects experiment to explore the hypothesis 
that the task of generating a search query for searching the Internet imbues a memorial advantage 
over generating an answer from memory. We included three conditions to test the idea that the 
act of generating a search query is the critical act that serves to enhance memory. Those are: 
memory (i.e., attempting to retrieve answers from memory), search (i.e., using a smartphone to 
search for answers), and memory+ (i.e., generating a search query for each question as if they 
would use Google, then attempting to retrieve the answer from memory). Participants completed 
a cued-recall test for all questions one week later and recall accuracy was measured as the 
proportion of questions that they answered correctly.  
Our primary hypothesis concerned differences between Search and Memory conditions 
on recall accuracy (H0: Evidence for Search = Memory and H1: Evidence for Search ≠ Memory). 
Based on our previous observations (Siler, Hamilton, & Benjamin, 2018), we predicted: 
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H1: Using a phone to search for an answer to a general-information question leads to 
higher recall accuracy one week after the initial test than attempting to retrieve the answer from 
memory (Hypothesis 1: Search > Memory).  
Such a result would support the idea that there are memory benefits to information 
retrieval via internet search. We address the effect of query generation on recall accuracy by 
comparing the Memory condition to the Memory+ (H0: Evidence for Memory = Memory+ and 
H1: Evidence for Memory ≠ Memory+). We predict: 
H2: Generating a search query and attempting to retrieve the answer from memory leads 
to higher recall accuracy one week after the initial test than only attempting to retrieve the 
answer from memory (Hypothesis 2: Memory+ > Memory).  
Such a result would suggest that the act of generating a search query has beneficial 
consequences for memory beyond the benefits of self-generating answers. Finally, we compare 
differences between Search and Memory+ conditions on recall accuracy (H0: Evidence for 
Search = Memory+ and H1: Evidence for Search ≠ Memory+). We predict:  
H3: Generating a search query and attempting to retrieve the answer from memory 
during the initial test will not show differences in recall accuracy over using a phone to search 
for answers (Hypothesis 3: Memory+ = Search).  
Such a result suggests that Search and Memory+ conditions invite similar encoding 
processes. This finding would provide evidence in favor of the notion that the act of generating 
search queries during internet search predicts beneficial consequences for memory. 
Method 
Methods, procedures, target sample size, exclusion rules, and analysis plan were pre-
registered before we started data collection for this experiment (https://osf.io/zvja6/).  
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Participants 
Results from a previous experiment showed that participants better remembered the 
answers to questions originally looked up on a phone than questions they originally tried to 
answer from memory (Cohen’s d = 0.256). We conducted an a priori power analysis using 
G*Power 3.9.2 to determine the sample size needed to detect an effect of at least d = 0.256 with 
90% power. We deemed 90% power appropriate because the effect in our previous experiment 
was not predicted, and therefore likely exaggerated. We planned to first recruit a sample of 131 
participants, or further until a Bayes Factor of over 3 (or under 0.33) is achieved. According to 
Jeffreys (1961), Bayes Factors under 3 (and above 0.33) do not constitute much evidence for one 
hypothesis over another. Participants were recruited through the undergraduate course credit 
subject pool in the Department of Advertising at a large midwestern university. The final sample 
contained 139 participants (75.5% women, Mage=19.94, SDage=1.33, range = 18-27).  
Design  
This experiment consisted of a manipulation of query generation method, resulting in a 
three-level within-subjects design (query generation method: search, memory, memory+).  
Materials 
Our stimuli consisted of 60 general-information questions on topics like history, 
geography, and pop culture gathered from Ward (2013). These questions range from easy to 
moderate difficulty. All questions are “Google-able” such that answers to each question can be 
found in a knowledge graph (i.e., a textbox at the top of the search results that contains a concise 
answer with a link to the reference source (e.g., What is a baby kangaroo called? Answer: Joey). 
Appendix B presents the questions and answers used in this experiment. 
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For the Search condition, participants used either an Apple iPhone 4s or a Google Nexus 
5 provided by the lab depending on whether participants owned a smartphone with an iPhone or 
Android operating system, respectively. 
Procedure 
All participants completed the same general methodology: a manipulation (study) phase 
and a recall phase taking place after one-week delay. In the first phase, we manipulated how 
participants answered 60 general-information questions. In the second phase, we measured recall 
accuracy through a cued-recall test on all 60 questions.  
Manipulation (study) phase. During the manipulation phase, participants answered 10 
randomly selected general-information questions presented one at a time across six rounds. 
Before each round, participants were instructed on how they would be answering the questions. 
These instructions serve as the main within-subjects manipulation. Search condition: “Use 
Google on the phone to answer these questions. Even if you think you might know the answer to 
a trivia question, please use the phone to find ALL the answers.” Memory condition: “Answer 
these questions as best you can.” Memory+ condition: “Imagine you have to use the phone to 
answer this question, how would you search for it? Type in what you would enter into Google, 
then answer the question as best you can.” Participants received corrective feedback after each 
provided answer on the computer screen directly under their answer text (i.e., right/wrong + 
correct answer), regardless of condition. 
Final cued-recall phase (one-week delay). Participants returned to the lab exactly one-
week later to complete the recall phase. During the recall phase, the same 60 general-information 
questions were presented one at a time in random order. All participants were told that they 
would be shown the same set of trivia questions and they should answer each question as best 
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they can from their own memory. Participants did not receive corrective feedback after providing 
an answer to each question. Once they completed this final test, participants answered 
demographic questions and were debriefed and thanked for their time.  
Measures 
Cued-Recall. Responses on the cued-recall test were counted as “correct” if they very 
closely match the correct answer (i.e., slight misspellings or conceptual matches will still count 
as “correct”). These judgments were made by a research assistant blind to condition and 
experimental hypotheses.  
Reaction Time (RT). RT was recorded for each answer provided measured as the 
interval of time in seconds (s) between the presentation of the trivia question to the submission of 
an answer. 
Results 
All data are available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/zvja6/). Data were 
analyzed using Bayesian inferences to allow for evaluations in favor of both the null and 
alternative hypotheses. Specifically, these Bayesian analyses evaluated the likelihood of a point 
null hypothesis (i.e., Cohen’s d = 0) to that of a JZS alternative prior. Following 
recommendations by Jeffreys (1961), Bayes factors greater than 3 and less than 0.33 are 
interpreted as the minimum criteria for evidence in favor of the alternative or null, respectively. 
Comparable analyses using null hypothesis significance testing are included at a false positive 
rate of 5% for heuristic value. 
Cued-Recall 
Figure 3 depicts mean accuracy scores across conditions in both phases of the 
experiment.  
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An analysis of condition on mean accuracy during the manipulation phase yielded strong 
evidence in favor of the alternative model, F(2, 138) = 556.2, BF10= 1.13E+114, p < .001. 
Differences in mean accuracy between groups were evaluated by conducting pairwise 
comparisons by Bayesian t-tests for Memory vs. Search, Memory vs. Memory+, and Search vs. 
Memory+. As expected, mean accuracy during the manipulation phase was higher for items in 
the Search condition (M = .867, SD = .11) than the Memory condition (M = .370, SD = .15, 
BF10= 2.25E+91, p < 0.001) and Memory+ condition (M = .370, SD = .15, BF10= 2.25E+91, p < 
0.001). Mean accuracy scores in the Memory condition were about the same as the Memory+ 
condition (BF10= .144, p = 0.878).  
 An analysis of condition on mean accuracy during the final cued-recall phase yielded 
strong evidence in favor of the null model, F(2, 138) = .694, BF10= 0.05, p = 0.500.  Mean 
accuracy scores were about the same between Memory (M = .624, SD = .17) and Memory+ (M = 
.600, SD = .17, BF10= .252, p = .467), Memory and Search (M = .613, SD = .17, BF10= .151, p = 
.854), and Memory+ and Search (BF10= .161, p = 0.797). 
 
Figure 3. Recall accuracy measured as proportion correct on a cued-recall test during the manipulation 
phase (1) and the final cued-recall phase (2) collapsed across condition. Error bars represent standard 
error. 
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RT 
 Figure 4 depicts mean RT scores across conditions in both phases of the experiment.  
An analysis of condition on mean RT during the manipulation phase yielded strong 
evidence in favor of the alternative model, F(2, 138) = 168.3, BF10= 4.58E+50, p < .001. Mean 
RT during the manipulation phase was higher for items in the Memory condition (M = 10.3, SD 
= 4.38) than the Search condition (M = 21.0, SD = 5.76, BF10= 1.12E+46, p < 0.001) and 
Memory+ condition (M = 20.8, SD = 4.89, BF10= 1.83E+38, p < 0.001). Mean RT scores in the 
Search condition were about the same as the Memory+ condition (BF10= .138, p = 0.938).  
 An analysis of condition on mean RT during the final cued-recall phase yielded strong 
evidence in favor of the null model, F(2, 138) = .363, BF10= 0.038, p = 0.500. Mean RT scores 
were about the same between Memory (M = 7.68, SD = 2.90) and Memory+ (M = 7.60, SD = 
3.27, BF10= .137, p = .955), Memory and Search (M = 7.84, SD = 3.71, BF10= .152, p = .846), 
and Memory+ and Search (BF10= .181, p = 0.679). 
 
Figure 4. RT measured as the average interval of time in seconds between the presentation of a trivia 
question to the submission of an answer on a cued-recall test during the manipulation phase (1) and the 
final cued-recall phase (2) collapsed across condition. Error bars represent standard error. 
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Discussion 
The primary goal of this experiment was to present an empirical example of research that 
seeks to provide answers regarding the various encoding strategies available to media users and 
their consequences on the ability to accomplish a particular cognitive goal. In this case, this 
experiment tests the influence of using a search engine or memory to retrieve information on 
memory performance under the pretense that query generation is a component of internet search 
driving the observed effect. 
The addition of the Memory+ condition, generating a search query and then answering 
from memory, allows for a shift in focus from the features of tools that exhibit the capacity for 
core processes of interest (e.g., using a search tool) to mechanisms underlying those object-
outcome links. As noted previously, past investigations of cognitive offloading on performance 
assumed a one-to-one mapping of the task (i.e., offloading information) and the processes 
underlying the task. In this way, researchers operated under an assumption that the task of 
offloading cognition (e.g., saving a file) was process-pure with respect to the type of processing 
media users undergo during an instance of offloading.  
In fact, our research team has previously committed this error while predicting the 
outcome of a similar experiment that tested the effect of searching on memory performance. In 
our previous experiment, we had assumed that using a phone to search the Internet would be a 
passive task, equivalent to a ‘read only’ condition in a generation experiment. Yet, because 
participants viewed general-information questions on a stationary lab computer, but using a 
smartphone to search for the answer, participants rarely transcribed the text from the screen to 
their handheld device verbatim. The act of generating a search query is one way that searching is 
not an entirely passive experience. An exploratory analysis revealed that participants on average 
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spent much more time completing phone blocks (M = 10.147, SD = 3.139) than memory blocks 
(M = 25.411, SD = 7.789), B10 > 10000 (Siler, Hamilton, & Benjamin, 2018). The time spent 
searching for an answer on a phone may also have given participants more time to contemplate 
the answer to the query while completing the task. In fact, these findings mimic similar results 
from a vocabulary learning task reported by Metcalfe and Kornell (2007). In the first phase, 
participants studied definition–word pairs (e.g., Disdainful; characterized by haughty scorn: 
Supercilious), and then freely-generated targets, were forced to generate targets, or read the 
targets in a second phase (with and without feedback). In a third phase, participants tried to 
produce the word corresponding to each of the definitions (cued recall). To the experimenters’ 
surprise, the generation conditions did not result in superior memory performance compared to 
the read-only conditions. In follow-up experiments in which learners were only able to passively 
read the materials, a large generation effect was observed. These findings indicate that self-
generation does not in and of itself produce superior memory compared to internet search, and 
instead, evidence of improved recall has more to do with the encoding processes that those 
strategies tend to recruit. The outcome of this experiment motivated the current investigation 
concerning memory benefits to information retrieval via internet search. In the proposed study, 
we argued that the process of actively generating a search query during internet search 
potentiates superior recall of the searched content. 
Using the extended organism framework, we can see how memory is not only a product 
of a general ability to remember, but also an ability to make strategic decisions about encoding. 
By viewing a media user’s performance as the product of both external and internal cognitive 
processes, we are able to draw inferences from our data that more accurately reflect cognitive 
processes and outcomes that occur in human-technology interactions. One advantage of internet 
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search, for example, is its capacity for “deep” processing, where greater depth implies more 
meaningful analysis (e.g., images, associations) of information; and subsequently, more 
elaborate, longer lasting memory traces (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). For example, after a question 
is presented (e.g., “What animal represents the astrological sign of Cancer?”) the internet 
searcher often adapts the query by selecting keywords and ignoring irrelevant syntax (e.g., 
“astrology cancer symbol”) in a way that minimizes effort and maximizes the expected signal-to-
noise ratio of the search. This act of information reduction guarantees a considerable degree of 
active engagement by the user on the query. An effective user will make decisions about which 
terms are likely to lead to an overabundance of information and modify or eliminate such terms. 
Yet another opportunity for deep processing during internet search occurs when a response to the 
query has been returned by the system. Internet search provides the user with a snippet of each 
potential response’s content, allowing the user to narrow down the search set further before 
committing to an in-depth examination of a particular piece of content.  
However, research has only begun to evaluate the memory consequences of internet 
search, and has paid little attention to the underlying cognitive processes that are responsible for 
memory effects. To date, researchers have mostly directed their attention to the negative 
consequences of internet search on memory (e.g., Barr, Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2015; 
Dong & Potenza, 2015; Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011). Research by Sparrow and colleagues 
(2011) has shown that people have lower rates of recall for information they believed would be 
accessible in the future compared to information they believe would be erased—a phenomenon 
coined the Google Effect. Searching the Internet has also been associated with lower accuracy in 
recalling information as compared to traditional book searching (Dong & Potenza, 2015). These 
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findings stand with a popular notion that Google is changing the way we think—and not for the 
better (Carr, 2008). 
The results of previous studies that point to negative effects of internet search on memory 
tend to tacitly promote the idea that searching the Internet is a passive activity. For instance, it 
makes sense that erased information is better remembered than saved information because there 
is no need to fully encode information that you are told will be available on demand at a later 
date. It also makes sense that finding answers to questions through the use of a printed 
encyclopedia leads to better recall of those answers than through an internet search engine 
because the time spent to find an answer in an encyclopedia requires a considerable degree of 
active engagement by the user on the task—so much engagement that, in an era when it was the 
only option for information search, it was avoided by all by the most curious and studious 
learners. Although these findings appear to indicate that internet search has negative 
consequences for memory, our starting point is the same as theirs: that more sustained cognitive 
involvement in the processes underlying search cue generation and outcome evaluation will lead 
to better memory. The cognitive benefits of internet search will depend on the degree to which 
the search task allows for such involvement, not whether the Internet is involved in the retrieval 
process.  
Now, we can use this evidence to evaluate the contexts during which each of these two 
encoding strategies are suitable for the task at hand. As discussed in Chapter 2, what constitutes 
optimal memory behavior involves knowing how to increase access to useful information, while 
decreasing the cost of doing so. Necessarily, the cognitive consequences of employing either 
encoding strategy depends on the demands of the task and the end goal. For example, if the goal 
is to learn answers to questions (i.e., retain information internally long-term), then our evidence 
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suggests that either encoding strategy would be suitable. If the goal were simply to answer those 
questions as accurately as possible, then evidence of superior accuracy in the Search condition 
than the Memory condition during Phase 1 suggests that online search would be a more 
appropriate decision. If the goal were to answer questions as quickly as possible, regardless of 
accuracy, then evidence of smaller RT in the Memory condition than the Search condition during 
Phase 1 suggests memory retrieval would be a more appropriate decision. 
In a technology-rich environment, where the information we seek is accessible at any 
time and everywhere, the overarching message of this research is theoretically significant—a full 
understanding of cognition in the digital age should not view cognitive technology (e.g., internet 
search engines) as supplanting human memory, but rather as diversifying memory. In doing so, it 
poses new coordination demands on the user that warrant empirical attention.  
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Chapter 4 
METACOGNITION 
 
Metacognition: A Concept Explication 
The second subprocess associated with more sophisticated media use is understanding 
how media users monitor and control the state of information available “in the head” and 
information out in the world in pursuit of their various goals.  
Metacognition is the ability to monitor the state of one’s own knowledge, or simply a 
person’s knowledge about their knowledge. The study of metacognition is driven by the 
understanding that the ability for a person to monitor their own knowledge underlies the ability 
to make appropriate decisions about encoding (Nelson & Narens, 1994). When a person chooses 
to offload responsibility, they enter a transactional relationship with the information source. In 
other words, the “knowledge” required to complete the task is external to the person. Therefore, 
the ability to complete the task is contingent on their ability to access the external information 
later on.  
Still, how people think about and monitor their own performance is highly imperfect 
(Soderstrom & Bjork, 2015). Because people can only make judgments based on subjective cues 
that are available at the time the judgment is made, there are countless ways in which a media 
user may misinterpret, or completely miss, metacognitive cues related to the task. Recent 
research suggests having unfettered access to the world’s knowledge via an internet-connected 
device makes the decision to offload even more tempting in the future. For example, Storm and 
colleagues (2017) showed that participants who searched Google for answers to difficult trivia 
questions were more likely to rely on Google to answer easier trivia questions compared to 
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participants who initially answered difficult trivia questions from memory. These findings 
suggest that relying on Google for outsourced knowledge influences the propensity to use 
Google in the future, even though this future use may not be necessary. In a similar vein, 
Ferguson and colleagues (2015) showed that people who relied on Google for answers to trivia 
questions were less willing to provide their own answers to questions. This suggests that the 
tendency to rely on external sources may influence the metacognitive processes that govern our 
beliefs about what we know or don’t know and our subsequent decisions about the extent to 
which we should rely on outsourced knowledge to support cognition. Although cognitive 
offloading can be adaptive in certain contexts, it requires accurate metacognitive monitoring 
(e.g., do I know this?) and metacognitive control (e.g., should I search?). 
The fundamental purpose of metacognitive experiments is to evaluate how well 
metacognition reflects memory (Benjamin & Diaz, 2008). Metacognitive judgments are 
considered to be accurate when individuals show some sort of a calibrated assessment of their 
memory’s failings and successes. Metacognitive accuracy can be difficult for a media user to 
achieve given that various features and affordances of media may influence metacognition in 
ways that are currently unknown to the user. Several researchers have begun to investigate the 
influence of cognitive offloading on metacognition. For example, Dunn, Gaspar, McLean, 
Koehler, & Risko (2018) found that people’s ability to accurately monitor their performance was 
worse during situations where an external aid was used. Siler, Hamilton, and Benjamin (2018) 
found support for their claim in a related study—memory for the original source of information 
(external vs. internal) was worse for information searched online compared to information 
retrieved from memory. The tendency to offload responsibility for information to digital source 
may negatively influence metacognitive accuracy. The goal of the current experiment is to 
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determine whether the act of offloading cognitive responsibility to technology leads to poorer 
metacognitive accuracy under the assumption that sharing cognitive responsibility with 
technology may make it more difficult to differentiate between attributes of technology and the 
self. 
Hamilton & Benjamin: Metacognitive Accuracy 
This experiment investigates the effect of various offloading tendencies on calibration of 
future metacognitive monitoring. When a person chooses to offload responsibility for 
information to a digital counterpart, the ability to make use of this information in the future is 
contingent on their ability to accurately assess where information is located within their extended 
cognitive system. This is where metacognitive accuracy plays an important role. Metacognitive 
judgments are considered to be accurate when individuals show some sort of a calibrated 
prediction of future failures and successes. Previous research suggests that sharing responsibility 
for information with the internet leads to undue confidence in internal cognitive abilities (Fisher, 
Goddu, & Keil, 2015; Ward, 2013). However, less is known about how this inflated sense of 
confidence influences the calibration and resolution of media users’ judgments. Therefore, the 
goal of Experiment 1 was to determine whether the act of offloading cognitive responsibility to 
technology leads to poorer metacognitive accuracy, under the assumption that sharing cognitive 
responsibility with technology makes it more difficult to differentiate between attributes of 
technology and the self (H0: Evidence for Constant search = Memory = Baseline and H1: 
Evidence for Constant search ≠ Memory ≠ Baseline). 
If search induces overconfidence, we can expect participants in the Constant search 
condition to report more confident metacognitive judgments compared to participants in the 
Memory condition and for scores to be independent of recall. 
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H1. Participants in Constant search will have higher metacognitive judgments compared to 
Memory and Baseline conditions (Hypothesis 1: Constant search > Memory & Baseline). 
  Additionally, metacognitive accuracy will be compared between all 3 conditions by 
conducting pairwise comparisons by Bayesian t-tests for Constant search/Memory, Constant 
search/Baseline, and Memory/Baseline (using a JZS prior). We predict: 
H2. Participants in Constant search will have worse metacognitive accuracy (calibration) 
compared to Memory and Baseline conditions (Hypothesis 2: Constant search < Memory & 
Baseline). 
If participants in the Constant search condition have worse metacognitive accuracy than 
Memory and Baseline conditions, it can be suggested that the act of searching may contribute to 
poorer monitoring. If participants in the Constant search condition have higher metacognitive 
accuracy than memory and baseline conditions, it can be suggested that the act of searching may 
be important to more accurate monitoring of the extended cognitive system. 
Method 
Participants  
An a priori power analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.4 indicated that about 82 participants per 
condition would provide sufficient power (greater than 80%) to detect an effect of at least d = .2 
at a false positive rate of 5%. The original sampling plan was to first recruit a sample of 250 
participants, or further until a Bayes Factor of over 3 (or under 0.33) is achieved. According to 
Jeffreys (1961), Bayes Factors under 3 (and above 0.33) do not constitute much evidence for one 
hypothesis over another. Participants were recruited through the undergraduate course credit 
subject pool in the Department of Advertising at a large midwestern university. In response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the university suspended face-to-face instructions for the rest of the 
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spring 2020 semester and the Department of Advertising Sona System suspended all in-person 
data collection. As a result, the reported sample contains 90 participants. 
Design  
This experiment consisted of a manipulation of retrieval method during the first of three 
rounds, resulting in a three-level between-subjects design (retrieval method: memory, constant 
search, baseline). 
Materials 
Our stimuli consisted of 60 general-information questions on topics like history, 
geography, and pop culture. All questions contain answers with a numerical value (e.g., What 
year did the first person land on the moon? Answer: 1969). Appendix C presents the questions 
and answers used in this experiment. 
Procedure 
All participants completed the same general methodology: a manipulation phase, a 
prediction phase, and a recall phase. 
Manipulation phase. During the manipulation phase, 20 general-information questions 
were randomly selected and presented one at a time. In the Memory condition, participants 
viewed a trivia question and answered the best they could from their own memory by typing 
their answer. In the Constant Search condition, participants viewed a trivia question and pressed 
a search icon on their screen to view the answer. Once they saw the answer, participants typed 
their answer. In the No Search condition, participants completed a filler arithmetic problem set of 
equivalent length.  
Prediction phase. During the metacognitive judgment phase, 40 new general-
information questions were selected and presented one at a time. All participants were told that 
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they would be shown a new set of trivia questions and would be asked to predict whether or not 
they would need to search for the answer in about 10 minutes. They were also told that each 
question would be presented on the screen for a duration of 6 seconds and they should try to 
make their predictions as quickly and as accurately as possible. The response scale ranged from 1 
(I am SURE I need to SEARCH the answer) to 4 (I am SURE I KNOW the answer).  
Recall phase. During the recall phase, the same 40 general-information questions were 
presented one at a time in the same order as the prediction phase. All participants were told that 
they would be shown the same set of trivia questions and they should answer each question as 
best they can from their own memory. Once they completed this final test, participants answered 
demographic questions and were debriefed and thanked for their time.  
Measures 
Metacognitive judgment. A single item measured metacognitive judgment ratings after 
each question was presented during the prediction phase. Responses were prompted by the text, 
“You have 6s to predict the probability of recalling the answer to this question.” Responses were 
recorded on a 1 to 4 interval scale in which higher prediction ratings indicate more confidence in 
personal knowledge [1=I am SURE I need to SEARCH the answer, 2= I MIGHT need to 
SEARCH the answer, 3=I MIGHT KNOW the answer, 4=I am SURE I KNOW the answer]. 
Cued-Recall. Responses on the cued-recall test (i.e., recall phase) were counted as 
“correct” if they were within 10 years of the correct answer.  
Metacognitive accuracy. Metacognitive accuracy was measured in terms of a calibration 
curve and the Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation (Nelson, 1986). 
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Results 
All data will be available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/ebj3h/). Data 
were analyzed using Bayesian inferences to allow for evaluations in favor of both the null and 
alternative hypotheses. Comparable analyses using null hypothesis significance testing are 
included at a false positive rate of 5% for heuristic value.  
Metacognitive judgments 
Figure 5 depicts mean judgment responses across conditions. An analysis of condition on 
mean judgments ratings yielded evidence in favor of the null model, F(2, 94) = .559, BF10= 0.13, 
p = 0.705. Differences in mean judgments between groups were evaluated by conducting 
pairwise comparisons by Bayesian t-tests for Memory vs. Baseline, Constant Search vs. 
Baseline, and Memory vs. Constant Search (using a JZS prior). Mean metacognitive judgment in 
the Memory condition (M = 1.82, SD = .45) was about the same as the Constant Search condition 
(M = 1.85, SD = .46, BF10 = 0.06, p = 0.967) and Baseline condition (M = 1.74, SD = .40, BF10 = 
0.28, p = 0.573). We did not have enough evidence to evaluate differences between Constant 
Search and Baseline conditions (BF10 = 0.93, p = 0.594).  
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Figure 5. Mean metacognitive judgment ratings collapsed across condition (1=I am sure I need to 
SEARCH the answer to 4= I am sure I KNOW the answer). Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Relative Calibration  
As a measure of relative accuracy (i.e., one item relative to another), a Goodman-Kruskal 
gamma correlation (γ) was computed between metacognitive judgments and subsequent recall 
with one γ computed for each subject. Figure 6 depicts mean γ scores across conditions. An 
analysis of condition on mean γ correlations yielded evidence in favor of the null model, F(2, 94) 
= .401, BF10= 0.13, p = 0.671. Mean γ correlations in the Memory condition (M = 1.82, SD = 
.45) was about the same as the Constant Search condition (M = 1.85, SD = .46, BF10 = 0.27, p = 
0.992) and Baseline condition (M = 1.74, SD = .40, BF10 = 0.32, p = 0.745). We did not have 
enough evidence to evaluate differences between Constant Search and Baseline conditions (BF10 
= 0.34, p = 0.712).    
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Figure 6. Relation between metacognitive judgments and cued-recall performance as operationalized by 
the value of the Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation (γ) as a function of the search manipulation 
(Constant Search vs. Memory vs. Baseline; left). An estimate of the isosensitivity function from data as 
operationalized by the cumulative proportions across the rating scale from right to left, such that the 
fourth level (i.e., “I am sure I KNOW”) contains the proportion of all four responses (right). The 
sensitivity of the ratings can be evaluated by the distance of the isosensitivity function from chance 
performance indicated by the diagonal line. 
 
Absolute Calibration 
The primary focus on metacognitive accuracy was in terms of relative calibration, in 
which the association between performance and judgments is evaluated. An analysis of 
metacognition in terms of the absolute calibration, in which mean performance and mean 
judgments collapsed across judgment ratings and conditions, was also conducted to summarize 
the degree to which rating values accurately estimate performance. Figure 7 depicts the 
proportion of correct responses collapsed across condition at each level of metacognitive 
judgement rating (1=I am sure I need to SEARCH the answer to 4= I am sure I KNOW the 
answer).  
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Figure 7. Calibration curve representing mean proportion of recall at each level of predicted recall by 
condition. Metacognitive accuracy as a function of the search manipulation can be evaluated by the 
degree to which lines resemble the main diagonal of perfect calibration. 1 = I am sure I need to SEARCH 
the answer, 2 = I might need to SEARCH the answer, 3 = I might KNOW the answer, 4 = I am sure I 
KNOW the answer. 
An analysis by Bayesian t-test was conducted to assess differences in recall performance 
between conditions on predicted recall at the end points of the absolute accuracy function.  
Proportion correct for questions participants were certain they would need to search was about 
the same across all three group comparisons: Memory–Constant Search (BF10= 0.269, p = 
0.997), Memory–Baseline (BF10= 0.280, p = 0.825), and Constant Search–Baseline (BF10= 
0.305, p = 0.819). Proportion correct for questions participants were certain they would know 
was inconclusive across all group comparisons, except between Memory and Constant Search 
conditions, which yielded evidence in favor of the null model: Memory–Constant Search (BF10= 
0.317, p = 0.999), Memory–Baseline (BF10= 0.423, p = 0.575), and Constant Search–Baseline 
(BF10= 0.430, p = 0.638). See Table 1 for means and standard deviations. 
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 P(Correct|SURE-SEARCH) P(Correct|SURE-KNOW) 
 M SD M SD 
Memory .155 .110 .623 .363 
Constant Search .158 .104 .618 .360 
Baseline .138 .149 .724 .375 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for mean conditional probabilities of correct responses on the final recall 
test at endpoints of the absolute calibration function. 
 
Discussion 
The primary goal of this experiment was to present an empirical example of research that 
seeks to provide answers regarding the influence of various encoding strategies on 
metacognition. Specifically, this experiment tests the influence of using a search engine or 
memory to retrieve information on metacognitive accuracy, which evaluates how well judgments 
reflect performance. 
 Making smart decisions about encoding depends on the media user’s ability to monitor 
the state of their own knowledge and monitor the capacity of their external environment to 
successfully accommodate a cognitive goal. Relying on a digital device to hold on to 
nonessential or infrequently used information like addresses and birthdates may be adaptive, but 
the adaptiveness of this decision depends on whether the offloader is reasonably confident that it 
is not essential for this information to be internally encoded and that they will have access to 
their digital device when this information is needed. Due to COVID-19, results from this 
experiment are based on data from 90 participants, approximately one-third of the sample size 
needed to achieve adequate power based on an a priori power analysis. Results from an analysis 
of condition on mean judgments ratings yielded evidence in favor of the null model, suggesting 
that using digital means to constantly search for answers to general-information trivia questions 
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does not induce a search-induced overconfidence demonstrated in prior research (e.g., Fisher, 
Goddu, & Keil, 2015; Hamilton & Yao, 2018; Ward, 2013). Similarly, results from an analysis 
of condition on mean gamma (γ) correlations yielded evidence in favor of the null model. 
Contrary to prior work, constant internet search does not appear to have consequences for the 
ability to accurately assess personal knowledge. However, we hesitate to draw inferences upon 
these data until our planned sample size (N= at least 250) is achieved. Figure 8 illustrating 
metacognitive calibration at each judgment option allows for the heuristic assessment of whether 
individuals’ judgments of knowledge reflect actual memory performance or match a pattern of 
under confidence or overconfidence. Data from our model suggest a general trend of 
overconfidence across condition such that participants tend to overestimate their ability to 
answer general-information trivia questions from their own memory. Interestingly, evidence 
seems to suggest that participants who either constantly searched or constantly relied on their 
own memory demonstrate worse metacognitive accuracy than those in the baseline condition at 
extreme ends of the judgment scale (i.e., I am SURE…), but not at middle ranges of the 
judgment scale (i.e., I MIGHT…). Understanding strategic memory skill in terms of relative and 
absolute calibration directs the researcher’s evaluation of findings toward understanding a 
person’s ability to take appropriate action in pursuit of goals, rather than understanding simply a 
person’s perceptions under the influence of technology. 
Given the transactive nature of digital media use, we can expect digital media to continue 
to become a pervasive aspect of daily life. That said, we can use evidence from this experiment 
to better understand the influence of pervasive media on the ability to make appropriate decisions 
about when digital media are needed for help accomplishing our cognitive goals. If we find that 
the act of constant search produces poorer metacognitive accuracy than both memory retrieval 
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and baseline, we will have evidence to suggest immersion in a mediated environment will pose 
negative consequences for metacognition. If we find that both the act of constant search and 
memory retrieval produces poorer metacognitive accuracy, we will have evidence to suggest that 
relying on memory alone does not allow the media user to develop the metacognitive intuition to 
make appropriate decisions about when to search.  
 
 
 
 
  
59 
Chapter 5 
TECHNOLOGICAL BIASES 
The empirical study in this chapter is Experiment 2 for a journal article published as: 
Hamilton, K. A., & Yao, M. Z. (2018). Blurring boundaries: effects of device features on metacognitive 
evaluations. Computers in Human Behavior, 89, 213-220. 
 
Technological Biases: A Concept Explication 
The third subprocess associated with more sophisticated media use is understanding how 
certain characteristics of technology can impair monitoring and control processes. 
Media are playing a large and increasing role in supporting human cognition. The 
availability of new technology-enabled encoding strategies place responsibility on the media user 
to select encoding strategies that are appropriate to the demands of a given cognitive task. Doing 
so requires that the media user has a fairly sophisticated understanding of the limits of their own 
knowledge and the strengths and weaknesses of offloading information to a digital source. 
Becoming proficient in monitoring and controlling one’s media use is particularly difficult in the 
face of technological biases that can misinform a person’s metacognitive perceptions, often 
resulting in feelings of overconfidence, or mislead their beliefs about the effectiveness of certain 
digitally-enabled strategies. Technological biases are systematic errors in thinking enabled by 
aspects of digital media that affect the decisions and judgments media users make. These biases 
are often a result of the mind’s attempt to simplify information at the time of encoding or 
retrieval. Technologies that augment cognition influence metacognition by imbuing the sense of 
familiarity or fluency in encoding or retrieving information and other invalid measures of 
knowledge and performance, which pose consequences for sophisticated media use. 
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An area of research that illustrates this dynamic between metacognition and media use is 
related to the concept of processing fluency. According to a review by Alter and Oppenheimer 
(2009), individuals often rely on the fluency or ease with which information comes to mind as a 
basis for their metacognitive judgments. Schwarz et al. (1991), for example, showed that the 
feeling of fluency a person experiences during a cognitive task predicts their metacognitive 
judgments independently of observable performance. This metacognitive error has also been 
studied within the context of media use. Ryffel and Wirth (2018) found that individuals who 
experienced fluency while watching television reports overestimated their knowledge about the 
issue depicted in the report. Because attributes of media often increase the ease of information 
retrieval, certain contexts of media use may make it difficult for users to make accurate 
metacognitive judgments. Hamilton, McIntyre, and Hertel (2016) found that people's ratings of 
their own job knowledge differed as a function of whether they reported using automatic search 
functions to find information versus searching manually. For people who reported having more 
organized files, manual search was associated with higher ratings of knowledge than if they 
searched with automated functions. The way in which one searches information may draw more 
or less attention to what one does and does not know.  
Technologies that expand the capacity of human cognition, while maintaining an illusion 
of non-mediation may have particularly powerful effects on perceptions of self (Sparrow & 
Chatman, 2013; Nestojko, Finley, & Roediger, 2013). Ward (2013) found that individuals who 
are able to use the internet to search for answers to trivia questions score significantly higher on 
a survey of Cognitive Self-Esteem (CSE), indicating that they are more confident in their ability 
to think about, remember, and locate information. Searching the internet may create an illusion 
that makes it difficult for individuals to distinguish the extent to which they rely on outsourced 
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knowledge. Hamilton and Yao (2018) extended this line of research by pointing out that the 
unique features of the device used to offload cognition may contribute to metacognitive 
evaluations. When all participants could use the internet to search for information, people who 
used their personally-owned device reported higher CSE compared to people who used a control 
(lab) device. This suggests that features and affordances embedded within a human-technology 
dynamic play an important role in enabling or constraining inflated cognitive evaluations. More 
recently, Hamilton, Ward, and Yao (2019) investigated the cognitive consequences of accessing 
information through voice-activated digital assistants, which may simultaneously reduce friction 
and introduce another mind into the mix. In a wine selection task, participants who used a digital 
assistant imbued with human-like features reported lower CSE than participants who used a 
nonhuman-like digital assistant. Transforming our digital interactions into interpersonal 
experiences may be one way to calibrate our understanding of our own knowledge when we 
access information online. 
Differences in self-assessed knowledge have often been studied through a manipulation 
of some material feature of a technological medium, generally the specific features a given 
medium embodies (e.g., Digital assistants [voice vs. no voice]; Smartphones [owned vs. non-
owned]; Search engines [typed search vs. non-typed search]). For example, Fisher et al. (2015) 
found that people who clicked on a link to find answers to questions reported lower self-assessed 
knowledge than people who actively searched for answers. The findings generate insight by 
pinpointing the technology-driven variables that bias media users’ perceptions of their personal 
knowledge and imply negative consequences for decision-making.  
The present investigation provides an empirical example of research that seeks to identify 
technological biases that threaten effective use of media. The goal of this demonstration is to 
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illuminate a possible way of isolating the psychological effects of key technological variables 
and then to use an extended organism perspective to speculate the effectiveness of this approach 
with respect to the major shortcomings of media research. In doing so, hopefully researchers will 
begin to pursue new directions in unraveling the technological biases that can impair monitoring 
and control processes. 
Hamilton & Yao: Ownership and Modality Biases 
This experiment directly examines whether differences in the type of device participants 
used to retrieve information could predict CSE, while holding internet use constant. The main 
technological attributes of interest were ownership (H0: Evidence for Owned = Not Owned and 
H1: Evidence for Owned ≠ Not Owned) and modality (H0: Evidence for Smartphone = Laptop 
and H1: Evidence for Smartphone ≠ Laptop), which were manipulated in a 2 × 2 between-
subjects design. To manipulate ownership, participants either used their own device or a control 
device (i.e., an unfamiliar device supplied by the lab) to complete a 10-item trivia quiz. To 
manipulate modality, participants either used a smartphone or a laptop to complete the trivia 
quiz. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to complete the CSE scale and report 
their familiarity with the device used to complete the experiment. 
 Based on evidence for routine use of a device as a moderator of the effect, we expected 
that a personally-owned device (compared to an unfamiliar control device) and a mobile device 
(compared to a stationary device) would be more likely to influence cognitive evaluations. 
Consequently, we proposed: 
H1a: Retrieving answers to trivia questions from a personal (owned) device would result 
in higher cognitive evaluations compared to retrieving answers from a control device 
(Hypothesis 1a: Owned > Not Owned). 
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H1b: Retrieving answers to trivia questions from a smartphone results in higher 
cognitive evaluations compared to retrieving answers from a laptop (Hypothesis 1b: Smartphone 
> Laptop). 
Method 
Participants 
We aimed to recruit about 30 participants per cell (total 120 participants) based on the 
minimum suggested power (80%) used to detect differences between groups (Cohen, 1988; 
VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007).3 During the experiment session, we recruited 147 undergraduate 
students from advertising classes at a large midwestern university in the United States. 
Participants completed the study in exchange for extra credit. 32 participants indicated that they 
did not use Google to search for answers to all ten trivia questions (i.e., searched < 10), and 
therefore, were excluded from the study. The final sample contained 115 individuals (21 men, 94 
women). Ages ranged from 18 to 25 years old (M = 19.63, SD = 1.17). Participants indicated 
being either “extremely familiar” (n = 112) or “moderately familiar” (n = 3) with Google as a 
search engine for finding answers. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
Design  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions—owned smartphone, 
owned laptop, control smartphone, or control laptop. Participants received an email prior to their 
lab session with instructions about what they needed to bring to complete the experimental task. 
During the lab session, each participant was instructed to use the device assigned to them to 
complete the ten-item trivia quiz and questionnaire that followed (experiment used the same 
questions from Experiment 1). Before beginning the trivia quiz, all participants were reminded to 
use their device to find all their answers (“Even if you already know the answer to a question, 
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please use [your personal mobile device/ your personal laptop/ our lab’s mobile device/ our lab’s 
laptop] to confirm your answer”). Participants who did not follow the instructions were removed 
from the study. 
Measures 
Response accuracy. Responses to the ten-item trivia quiz were scored such that 
participants received one point for each correct response. Responses were counted as “correct” if 
they very closely or exactly match the correct answers (slight misspellings or conceptual matches 
were counted as “correct”). Responses were coded by a research assistant blind to condition and 
experimental hypotheses. 
Cognitive evaluations. Immediately after completing the 10-item trivia quiz, participants 
completed the Cognitive Self-Esteem Scale (CSE; Ward, 2013). This 14-item scale measures 
participants’ beliefs about their cognitive abilities. The CSE scale contains three sub-components 
that assess confidence in the ability to think (e.g., “I am good at thinking”), to remember (e.g., “I 
have a better memory than most people”), and to locate information (e.g., “When I don’t know 
the answer to a question right away, I know where to find it”). Responses were coded on a 7-
point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree), such that higher ratings would indicate 
higher levels of CSE. The CSE scale demonstrated good reliability (α = .93). 
Time spent. Time spent was measured by recording the number of seconds participants 
spent answering the trivia questions from when the page loaded to when the “Next” button was 
selected. 
Results 
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Data were analyzed using null hypothesis significance testing at a false positive rate of 
5%. Comparable analyses using Bayesian inferences are included where possible for heuristic 
value.  
Operational Familiarity. A single-item question assessed the extent to which 
participants felt familiar with the basic features of the device they used to complete the trivia 
quiz (from 1 = not at all familiar to 100 = extremely familiar). 
Inclusion of Device in the Self (IDS) Scale. The IDS scale is adapted from the Inclusion 
of Other in the Self (IOS) scale measuring interpersonal interconnectedness characterized by a 
lessened self/other distinction (Aron et al., 1992). In the IDS Scale, respondents select the picture 
that best describes their relationship from a set of seven Venn-like diagrams each representing 
different degrees of overlap of two circles representing “Self” and “Device.” 
Frequency of Use. This question assessed the extent to which participants used their 
device as part of their daily routine (from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). 
Device Attachment. This measure asks participants to indicate their agreement with 11-
items related to their device use (e.g., “If I did not have my device with me, I would be 
uncomfortable because I could not stay up-to-date with social media and online networks”). 
Responses were coded on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree), such that 
higher ratings would indicate higher levels of attachment. This measure was adapted from a 
nomophobia questionnaire (Yildirim, 2014), which measured the fear of not being able to use a 
device and/or the services it offers. Participants responded to the questionnaire for their 
attachment to their smartphone and laptop computer separately. The device attachment scale 
demonstrated good reliability (α = .95). 
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Hypothesis 1: Effect of Ownership and Modality conditions on CSE 
A two-way ANCOVA was conducted to evaluate the effect of Ownership (own versus 
control) and Modality (smartphone versus laptop) on CSE ratings while controlling for response 
accuracy to the ten-item trivia quiz.1 In support of the main prediction, results indicate a 
significant main effect of Ownership, such that participants had higher overall CSE scores when 
they used their own device (M = 5.21 SD = .74) compared to participants who used a control 
device (M = 4.93, SD = .90) to complete the experiment, F(1, 115) = 4.07, p = .046, 𝜂
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙
2  = 
.036. Also in support of our main prediction, results indicate a significant main effect of 
Modality, such that participants had higher overall CSE scores when they used a smartphone (M 
= 5.30, SD = .86) compared to participants who use a laptop (M = 4.82, SD = .74) to complete 
the experiment, F(1, 115) = 8.43, p = .004, 𝜂
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙
2 = .071 (Figure 8). The interaction effect of 
Ownership and Modality on CSE was not significant (p = .934). 
 
Figure 8. Effect of ownership and modality manipulations on Cognitive Self-Esteem (CSE) scores 
(n=115). Error bars represent standard error. 
 
1 The original manuscript did not control for response accuracy. 
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Exploratory Mediation Analysis: CSE TM Mediates the Effect of Modality on CSE 
Thinking 
 The hypothesized process was tested by mediation analysis using the PROCESS macro 
(Hayes, 2018) with 5,000 bootstrapped samples to test whether the relationship between 
modality and heightened confidence in internal knowledge can be explained by confidence in the 
ability to use digital tools to accomplish intellectual goals. The model predicts mean responses to 
the CSE thinking sub-component (e.g., “I am smart”) with modality as the independent factor (0 
= smartphone, 1 = laptop) and mean responses to the CSE transactive memory (TM) sub-
component (e.g., “I have a knack for tracking down information”) as the mediator. Consistent 
with H1, the regression of modality on CSE thinking was significant (𝛽 = -.47, SE = .17, p = 
.048). Step 2 showed that using a smartphone to answer general-information questions produced 
significantly higher scores on the CSE TM sub-component than using a laptop (𝛽 = -.36, SE = 
.16, p = .032). Furthermore, scores on the CSE thinking sub-component were significantly and 
positively related to scores on the CSE TM sub-component (𝛽 = .57, SE = .08, p < .001). In Step 
3, the model indicated a significant indirect effect of modality condition on CSE thinking via 
CSE transactive memory (𝛽 = -.21, SE = .10) because bootstrapping analysis with 5,000 
interactions did not include 0 ([-.43, -.02]). The direct effect of modality condition on the CSE 
thinking sub-component, controlling for the influence of responses to the CSE TM sub-
component was not significant (𝛽 = -.27, SE = .14, p = .055). These observations support the 
prediction that CSE TM mediates the effect of modality condition on CSE thinking. A 
comparable mediation analysis was conducted to test whether the relationship between 
ownership and heightened confidence in knowledge can be explained by confidence in the ability 
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to use digital tools to accomplish intellectual goals, however the regression of ownership on CSE 
thinking (Step 1) was not significant (p = .059). 
Exploratory Multiple Regression Analysis: Relationship between Device Familiarity, 
Attachment, IDS, and Frequency of Use on CSE-TM 
Data were analyzed by multiple linear regression to develop a model for predicting the 
transactive memory sub-component from aspects of familiarity. Basic descriptive statistics and 
regression coefficients are shown in Table 2. The four predictor variables accounted for 56.7% of 
the variance in CSE-TM, which assesses people’s perceived ability to accomplish their 
intellectual goals with digital tools, F(4, 110) = 13.05, p < .001, R2 = .567. Device familiarity (𝛽 
= .024, SE = .004, p < .001) and attachment (𝛽 = .16, SE = .05, p = .002) were significant 
predictors of CSE-TM. 
 Zero-Order r 
𝛽 SE p 
Predictor CSE-TM A B C D 
Operational FamiliarityA .480*     .024 .004 .000 
Device AttachmentB .218* -.067    .162 .050 .002 
IDSC -.052 -.025 .181   -.065 .040 .107 
Frequency of UseD -.235* -.216* -.090 -.318*  -.267 .146 .071 
         
M 5.38  88.38 17.99 4.00 1.24    
SD .90 17.04 1.44 1.90 .52    
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics, correlations, and multiple-regression statistics for the relationship between 
operational familiarity, attachment, IDS, and frequency of use on CSE-TM. N = 115, *p < .05.  
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Discussion 
The goal of this experiment was to present a concrete example of research that seeks to 
identify the various technological biases that impair monitoring and control processes relevant to 
strategic decision-making about media use. In this case, this experiment examines the role of 
ownership and modality on perceptions of knowledge operationalized as cognitive self-esteem 
(Ward, 2013).  
Being effective in assessing one’s own knowledge, let alone their extended knowledge, 
demands the understanding that media users are subject to innumerable biases during the 
monitoring process. This experiment demonstrates that using a personally-owned or mobile 
device to offload cognition uniquely influences perceptions of personal knowledge. Indeed, 
feelings of confidence are likely to occur when the successful retrieval of information via digital 
means is judged as an indicator of internal knowledge when accessed through a device that is 
easily conflated as a natural extension of self.  
Applying an extended organism lens to the evaluation of this study provides greater 
insight into the implications of these findings for the strategic selection of a media strategy. First, 
employing an approach that seeks to study technologies in terms of the specific variables they 
embody allows the researcher to isolate the effects of key technological variables on outcomes—
in this case, knowledge confidence—relevant to strategic media use. Still, in a dynamic and 
constantly-evolving media environment where our actions are a product of the complex 
relational structure in human-technology partnerships, it is less useful to draw inferences from a 
manipulation of the material features of a device (e.g., smartphone vs. laptop) because it does not 
help us to explain the psychological and behavioral mechanisms that help to predict these 
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outcomes in the long-term as outcomes emerge in the dynamic relation between the user, the 
material features, and the situated nature of use (Evans et al., 2017). 
 Nonetheless, until experiments are able to narrow in on the underlying phenomena that 
endure technological change, it is difficult to see how research will be able to spur a systematic 
study of novel technology-driven cognitive bias that threaten effective use of media at a broad 
level. Flanagin (2020) articulates potential solutions to this methodological problem, such as: (a) 
considering technologies only as manifestations of underlying phenomena, (b) focusing on the 
capacities of technologies that span across tools, and (c) emphasizing the development of 
theories that illuminate core processes that are inherently connected to technologies. The 
extended organism lens shows promise as an approach to facilitate development of such a 
solution as these aforementioned solutions are critical assumptions embedded within an extended 
organism approach, i.e., one that seeks to understand human behavior by understanding the 
process and abilities of the human-technology extended organism within its broader 
environment. 
The strategy of exploring data to unravel underlying processes of search-induced 
overconfidence contrasts with the strategy of understanding the outcome of an object-centered 
manipulation of device and may provide one solution to the aforementioned problems. The 
results of an exploratory mediation analysis demonstrates that using a mobile smartphone (vs. a 
stationary laptop) increased participants’ confidence in their ability to use digital tools 
strategically to accomplish their intellectual goals, which, in turn, increased confidence in their 
own (internal) knowledge. This supports the notion that search-induced overconfidence occurs 
through the process of conflating externally-accessible information as internally-produced. The 
results of an exploratory multiple regression analysis sheds light on the digitally-mediated factors 
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that potentiate such outcomes. A model developed for predicting the transactive memory sub-
component from aspects of familiarity accounted for 56.7% of the variance in CSE-TM scores, 
supporting that search-induced overconfidence are in part based on the application of a global 
heuristic of cue-familiarity and accessibility (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001; Bhargave, 
Mantonakis, & White, 2016, Ward, 2013). Specifically, operational familiarity, measured as the 
ease of using the basic features of the device used to complete the question-answering task, and 
the degree to which users are attached to their personal devices accounted for a significant 
portion of the variance in CSE-TM scores. Participants who reported familiarity with basic 
features of the experimental device or who reported higher device attachment also reported 
higher evaluations of their own strategic medial skill. This aligns with the trend of the tendency 
for people to feel more confident in their performance when a task is fluent than when it is 
disfluent (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Koriat, 1993). Confidence in internal knowledge appears to 
be based in part on the subjective ease with which information comes to mind whether those 
means of retrieval are digital or not.  
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
Media users’ effectiveness in accomplishing their intellectual and behavioral goals reflect 
their strategic approach to satisfying the variety of demands placed on them. Superior cognitive 
performance is determined by the nature of the media user’s goals and motivations as well as the 
sophisticated use of digital tools available in a particular context. In this sense, media users are 
pressed with making appropriate decisions toward goal attainment in the face of various 
mediated and non-mediated factors that threaten effective decision-making. Ultimately, the role 
of a strategic media user is to navigate the costs and benefits of engaging technology-enabled 
strategies, starting with the simple decision to use technology and ending with more complex 
decisions about the nature of that use. 
The goal of this research was to first outline the empirical domain of strategic media skill 
and then offer a perspective for observing the digital world and for answering questions about 
psychological processes and phenomena underlying truly skilled media use. We began this 
conversation with a description of the problem domain. Strategic media skill concerns a person’s 
ability to take appropriate action in pursuit of personal goals in the face of technology-enabled 
biases that can impair judgments. The necessity for strategic skills surrounding media use is not 
new, as it is relevant to the effective use of traditional (radio, newspapers) and novel (digital 
assistants, smartphones) media. Still, swift technological change has contributed to a society that 
is indebted to the devices that were designed to serve them. In the coming years, strategic media 
skills will become of paramount importance.  
73 
This dissertation presents the extended organism perspective as a guiding framework for 
discussing the fundamental nature of our human-technology interactions under contexts relevant 
to the skilled selection of mediated or non-mediated cognitive strategies in pursuit of intellectual 
or behavioral goals. Specifically, this lens poses it can be helpful in understanding a person’s 
adaptiveness and success in a variety a technology-mediated decision contexts to consider the 
characteristics of digital memory—the body of rote knowledge and various features of digital 
technology—as part of the human-technology extended organism, rather than an external 
environment on which the cognizer acts. Similar to the idea of swarm cognition in termites 
(Turner, 2011). The extended organism contains a dynamic body of knowledge that reacts and 
self-regulates in a changing environment and with changing goals. Our access to digital memory 
shapes the manner in which we achieve our intellectual goals and, simultaneously, our queries 
and contributions to digital memory shape the nature of the information it possesses and provides 
to others. Put more simply, choosing an extended organism perspective is to acknowledge that in 
order to understand the full cognitive consequences of living in today’s digitally-mediated 
environment, we should understand the capacities and risks of the unique group-mind that 
manifests when we come to expect technology to facilitate the accomplishment of our daily 
goals. Adopting this perspective should allow the researcher to abstain from, or at least be 
attentive to, some major shortcomings in media research, such as the temptation to privilege new 
media devices as important objects of study, the tendency to view humans and the technologies 
that inform their decisions as separable, and neglecting to acknowledge the enduring effect of 
our transactions with technologies on subsequent perceptions and behaviors.  
Through an extended organism lens, this approach also proposes critical questions that 
should be asked about strategic media skill, framed through the characterization of a truly 
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sophisticated media user. Those characteristics are: (a) recognizing key aspects of the functional 
architecture that characterizes the symbiosis between humans and digital media; (b) 
understanding how various cognitive strategies and techniques made possible by digital media 
influence short- and long- term communicative and cognitive goals; (c) knowing how media 
users monitor and control the state of information available “in the head” and information out in 
the world in pursuit of their various goals; and (d) understanding how certain characteristics of 
technology can impair these monitoring and control processes. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 offer an 
explication of the critical concepts underlying each characteristic—strategic encoding, 
metacognition, and technological biases, respectively—as well as a concrete empirical example 
that seeks to examine each of the subprocesses underlying strategic media skill. The discussion 
section at the end of each of these chapters offers an example of how the extended organism 
perspective can be employed as a process-oriented approach to predict and explain findings 
relevant to strategic media skill. 
Using a theoretical framework that focuses on processes rather than tasks or 
phenomenological features of digital media facilitates the identification and development of 
research that emphasizes aspects of technology-mediated human behavior enduring across 
technologies (Flanagin, 2020) and also serves as a bridge between memory research and research 
in attention and perception (Jacoby, 1991) and research in decision making (Nelson & Narens, 
1994). This will hopefully allow future researchers to evaluate strategic media skill using a 
systematic approach to provide unique insight that will contribute to broader theories. For 
example, a central theme across strategic media use scenarios is the critical role of controlled 
processing underlying performance. The term ‘controlled processing’ here refers to a person’s 
intentions and is subject to capacity limitations (Lang, 2006). This term stands in contrast to 
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‘automatic processing’ which refers to an orienting response that occurs as a consequence of 
stimulation and requires neither intention nor awareness. Like controlled processes, automatic 
processes can manifest as a source of interference or as a source of facilitation. Further, theories 
of mediated (e.g., Lang, 2006) and non-mediated (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) attention point out 
that behavioral outcomes underlying our personal goals arise from controlled and automatic 
processes that co-occur, are embedded in, and enable one another. Adopting a process-oriented 
approach to the study of strategic media skill facilitates the development of broader theories in 
this relevant domain. Future work should continue to explore the distinct contributions of active, 
controlled processing and of passive, automatic processing on skilled media use to unravel the 
fundamental nature of our digitally-mediated actions and reactions. 
The empirical research outlined in this dissertation contributes to a concrete application 
of the framework to the mediated context of offloading cognition to digital technology via online 
search. Cognitive offloading describes an encoding strategy where the user takes physical action 
to augment the information processing requirement of a task so as to reduce cognitive demand 
(Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Understanding the way that different technology-driven encoding 
strategies, like cognitive offloading, influence the ability to make appropriate decisions about 
media use contribute to a better understanding of the new roles and responsibilities of “thinkers” 
in today’s digital media environment. By that I mean an environment that is saturated by data 
sources and modes of information transmission that are diverse, complex, interconnected, and 
importantly, accessible anytime and everywhere. True, people have relied upon technologies to 
support memory and cognition for centuries with inventions such as the abaci, punch cards, and 
typewriters. But, only recently has the capacity to access and control enormous amounts of 
information become a pervasive and inconspicuous part of daily life. Not only do present-day 
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cognizers have near-constant access to the world’s body of knowledge (facts, perspectives, how-
to’s), but they also have access to several tools to help them accommodate the demands of 
intellectual goals (apps, software).  
The availability of new technology-enabled encoding strategies place the responsibility 
on the media user to select encoding strategies that are appropriate to the demands of a given 
cognitive task. The experiment in Chapter 3 assessed whether using an internet search engine to 
find answers to general-information trivia questions influenced memory for those answers one 
week later than retrieving answers from memory. Answering this question provides media users 
insight into the memorial consequences of these distinct encoding strategies; doing so from an 
extended organism perspective allows the researcher to evaluate the consequences of such a 
finding from a lens that is sensitive to the nature of our digitally-mediated experiences. 
Performance measures can be used to measure the short- and long-term behavioral consequences 
associated with various mediated or non-mediated encoding strategies. A reliable indicator of an 
effective encoding strategy is higher recall or recognition. For instance, in a question-answering 
task, participants demonstrated equal memory performance for answers searched online and 
answers retrieved from memory one week after the initial test. Unsurprisingly, participants 
performed better on the cued-recall test when they were able to use a smartphone to search for 
their answers, yet participants completed the task much more quickly if they were able to answer 
from memory and then receive immediate corrective feedback. If we view optimal memory 
behavior as actions that increase access to useful information while decreasing the cost of doing 
so, we can infer the contexts during which either encoding strategy should be employed. If a 
person’s goal is to complete the task quickly during phase 1 and perform competently during 
phase 2, then retrieving from memory should be more adaptive. If a person’s goal is to perform 
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competently during both phases, then using a search engine to facilitate task completion will 
likely be more adaptive. A major strength of an extended organism framework is its ability to 
provide a systematic lens for evaluating media use that shifts questions from whether or not to 
search online to when and how. 
Still, making smart decisions about encoding depends on the media user’s ability to 
monitor the state of their own knowledge and monitor the capacity of their external environment 
to successfully accommodate their cognitive goal. Relying on a digital device to hold on to 
nonessential or infrequently used information like addresses and birthdates may be adaptive, but 
the adaptiveness of this decision depends on whether the offloader is reasonably confident that 
they will have access to their digital device when this information is needed. The experiment in 
Chapter 4 assessed whether constantly searching for answers or constantly answering from 
memory (manifestations of the two encoding strategies evaluated in Chapter 3) influences the 
ability to make appropriate decisions about when to search. Answering this question provides 
media users insight into the consequences of their encoding decisions; doing so from an extended 
organism perspective allows the researcher to evaluate the consequences of such a finding from a 
lens that is privy to the transactive nature of our media use. Metacognitive accuracy can be used 
to measure the extent to which judgments about memory reflect actual memory. A reliable 
indicator of high metacognitive accuracy occurs when people show some sort of a calibrated 
understanding of their memory’s performance that is independent of actual levels of memory 
performance. Heuristic evidence from the experiment in Chapter 4 suggests that constant search 
or constant memory retrieval have similar negative consequences for metacognitive accuracy as 
demonstrated by lower gamma correlations in memory and constant search conditions than 
baseline. Given that data collection is still on-going, I hesitate to draw conclusions from these 
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data. However, such a finding would provide face validity for an extended organism model. If 
sophisticated use of media requires a person to learn principles that can be applied while making 
decisions about when and how to use digital media to accomplish goals, then invariability in the 
decision process will likely have negative consequences for the ability to make smart decisions 
about media use. 
Metacognitive accuracy can be particularly difficult for a media user to achieve given 
that various features and affordances of media may influence metacognition in ways that are 
currently unknown to the user. The experiment in Chapter 5 investigated the effect of ownership 
and modality features on knowledge confidence. Answering this question provides media users 
insight into the technological biases that threaten strategic media skill. Specifically, data 
demonstrate that participants hold higher confidence in personal knowledge when completing a 
question-answering task with either a personally-owned or mobile device. Although this is a step 
toward identifying novel media-driven biases that threaten skilled media use, more work is 
needed to determine sound, systematic approaches for answering such questions that avoid 
shortcomings of prior media research. 
Together, these findings illuminate practical ways that media users can strategically 
employ technology during the process of encoding to successfully accommodate the demands of 
their memory goals and also to discuss how those technology-driven encoding strategies may 
(ironically) influence the ability to make strategic encoding decisions in the future. Offloading 
cognition to a reliable device may provide unique opportunities to expand cognition to the extent 
that the decision to do so is appropriate given the functionality of the device and the nature of the 
memory goal. Features and affordances of new media offer new opportunities to support human 
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memory, but also pose new coordination demands on the media user to strategically monitor and 
control the state of their memory. 
Implications 
The experiments offer evidence to suggest that offloading cognition to a digital source 
provides new opportunities to extend cognition given that the decision to offload is appropriate 
to the demands of the task. With near-constant and reliable access to media, there are several 
advantages to sharing cognitive responsibility with a digital partner. Certain features of these 
external devices, like their vastness, depth, and longevity, unequivocally outperform human 
memory, which is fallible in many ways (Schacter, 2001). Yet, as technology plays a large and 
increasing role in supporting human cognition, we are increasingly facing situations that require 
us to decide whether we should or should not offload cognition to technology. This decision 
requires accurate monitoring of one’s own knowledge and reasonable understanding of how 
various offloading decisions influence short- and long-term goals.  
In the wake of recent technological advancements, there has been a surge of interest in 
unraveling the various ways that technology affordances enable, constrain, and alter memory 
behavior (e.g., Barr, Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2015; Henkel, 2014; Sparrow, Liu, & 
Wegner, 2011; Storm & Stone, 2014). However, less is known about the possible ways to equip 
media users with the skill to utilize cognitive offloading to their advantage. If we want to be 
more productive in understanding and explaining the processes and behaviors of present-day 
cognizers, our guiding questions must be framed with a consideration of the dynamic ways in 
which cognizers can strategically engage encoding processes to successfully accommodate 
intellectual goals. Investigating psychological phenomena relevant to strategic media skill 
through an extended organism lens provides one solution to this problem. 
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In general, this research is meant to illuminate unique contexts of memory practice made 
possible by a new, complex media space; and hopefully, lead researchers toward asking new 
questions—not about whether memory should be extended, but rather—about how to offer new 
answers to old questions given that memory has been extended. For a full understanding of 
technology-mediated memory and cognition, we may consider viewing new media technology as 
diversifying human memory, rather than supplanting human memory. As unique and diverse 
technology-driven encoding strategies continue to develop, our ability to adaptively integrate 
internal with external processes, and our ability to monitor the decision to do so, will be 
increasingly predictive of what it means to be a successful cognitive agent in a digital media 
environment. 
Novel Directions 
 The extended organism approach was illustrated and critiqued on the basis of cognitive 
offloading. This is one of many domains that may be of interest to those interested in studying 
strategic media skill. Here are others: 
Cognition Under Surveillance 
Data and metadata have become a legitimate currency for technology users to pay for 
their communication services and security. Masses of people naively or unwittingly trust their 
personal information—identifiers, interests, click behavior, search history—to corporate 
platforms often with little understanding of how these data points are used to strategically 
monitor and exploit users’ decision-making processes. As data continue to transform our daily 
lives through their incorporation in the daily operations of Internet of Things devices, cyber-
physical systems, and smart infrastructures, it will become increasingly important to consider 
unique opportunities for action through emerging technology that pose new consequences for the 
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ability of technology users to make strategic decisions in service of their intellectual and 
behavioral goals. 
One area of undeveloped research concerns a media user’s best decision strategy while 
under surveillance by an observing agent that does not have their best interest in mind. As an 
example, consider an e-commerce setting where a consumer is interested in reserving a hotel 
room online. Initially, the consumer acts as a learning agent by searching the internet for relevant 
services and affordable deals. The consumer may do so by entering keywords on a search engine, 
clicking sponsored content, or using third-party platforms to determine which hotel room to 
reserve. As the consumer continues to learn about the options available to them, they 
simultaneously reveal information to the observing agent, in this case corporate advertisers, 
about their knowledge and intentions. Likewise, each action the consumer takes to learn more 
before reserving a hotel room can be used by corporate advertisers to strategically exploit the 
consumer. The above example is not artificial. When analyzing prices of products presented to 
shoppers online, Hannak and colleagues (2014) found Priceline alters hotel search results based 
on the user’s history of clicks and purchases. Users who clicked on or reserved low-priced hotel 
rooms in the past received slightly different results in a much different order, compared to users 
who clicked on nothing, or clicked/reserved expensive hotel rooms. In general, the knowledge 
that their data are being monitored and potentially used against them, an intelligent technology 
user will strategically take actions in order to guide observing agents to incorrect beliefs and, 
consequently, maximize their utility when it comes to making a decision. 
Threats of Misinformation 
In August 2016, three months before the US presidential election, an article in The 
Political Insider made the, shall we say, provocative claim that Democratic candidate Hillary 
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Clinton sold weapons to the militant group ISIS (Roberts, 2016).Although the election story was 
quickly verified as false, the “fake news” story generated 789,500 shares, reactions, and 
comments on Facebook before the news outlet removed the story from its site (Silverman, 
2016).According to an article published by BuzzFeed Founding Editor Craig Silverman (2016), 
the 20 top-performing fake election stories accumulated over 8.7 million Facebook engagements 
in the final three months of the US presidential campaign. These points illustrate two important 
elements to consider about the human-machine extended organism. The first is that the internet is 
shaped by the people who use it. The vast and deep nature of the internet misleads many to treat 
the internet as an “omniscient” source of external memory. Indeed, several features of the 
internet, such as the diverse scope of information it covers, the speed at which it is able to access 
information, and its capacity to be continuously updated with new knowledge, distinguish the 
internet as a valuable knowledge source with expert information in an unfathomable number of 
domains. 
Yet other features of the internet, such as its indifference toward accuracy and relative 
permanence, reflect important exceptions to this generality. The proliferation of misleading, 
oversimplified, or incomplete information leaves the extended organism vulnerable to 
unprecedented dangers that threaten the successful use of memory. Under these circumstances, 
the growing symbiosis between internal and external memory poses a new coordination demand 
on the user to monitor and verify the accuracy of information accessed on the internet. As we 
become increasingly reliant on the internet for outsourced knowledge, we become more deeply 
involved in a cognitive system that favors information that is immediate over comprehensive, 
provocative over substantiated, and affirmative over contravening. 
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Limitations 
Generally, the goal of this research is to study strategic media skill in a broader 
theoretical context that commits to addressing a wider scope of issues related to access and skill. 
Specifically, this research uses experimental methods from cognitive and social psychology to 
help people learn how to access and manage their digital devices strategically within the 
constraints of their environment. By studying these interactions, a major goal of this research 
involves building theories about media skill that are flexible to a diverse range of individual 
contexts and goals. This highlights a critical limiting condition of this work. Although this 
research may best serve educationally or technological disadvantaged students who have not had 
the privilege to maintain reliable and secure internet access, this research is predominantly driven 
by studies represented by well-educated and frequent media users (e.g., university students). 
Indeed, research methods and ways of thinking in this area fail to consider the full range of 
experiences and skill levels of technology users, which have significant problems of validity 
particularly with respect to educationally disadvantaged students or students from culturally 
diverse groups. Future research will be needed to better understand the generalizability of this 
model across individuals. 
Concluding Remarks 
Many aspects of digital media—near-constant internet access, near-limitless rote 
information storage—can be employed strategically to help people accomplish daily tasks. That 
said, one’s level of digital media skill strongly influences effective use of these tools. The ability 
to participate in labor, earn an education, and maintain social contacts are determined by the 
ability to access and navigate information via digital devices.  
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To become a truly skilled media user it is necessary to learn the general principles and 
practices that can be applied while making decisions about when and how to use digital media to 
accomplish goals. The extended organism framework presents one solution to this problem by 
providing a concrete way of studying aspects of strategic media skill that better synchronizes the 
major concepts that give a voice to this research domain so that media researchers are better able 
to build on each other’s work to answer fundamental questions about the mind under the 
influence of media. Adopting a more consistent stance on the fundamental nature of our human-
technology interactions under contexts relevant to strategic media skill and reaching shared 
agreement on what are the primary questions that should be asked about our topic domain of 
strategic media skill means that theories can be verified, scrutinized, or extended in a manner 
that advances the field. 
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Appendix A: Strategic Skill Scenarios 
Scenario #1. Consider the case of a journalist completing a news report to be published 
online. Their short-term goal is to write a report so that all of the facts are correct. Assume in this 
scenario that the journalist’s reliability in verifying the veracity of factual information is 90.00% 
(they catch 9 of 10 errors). The reliability of the information that this journalist uses to write the 
report is 70.00% (7 of 10 facts are correct). Therefore, the overall reliability of this article will 
likely be 97.00%. A fact-checking software is installed on the journalist’s computer with a 
reliability of 80%. The assumption is that it will catch 8 out of 10 errors that the journalist fails to 
catch. So, the reliability of the article should now be 99.40%.  
How does this influence (short-term) performance on the task? Ideally, this would lead to 
a profitable trade off. If the journalist has the goal of producing reports with near perfect 
accuracy, then adding this software would allow the journalist to optimize their goal of writing a 
factual report. Instead, the reliability of the article dropped to 94.00%. Why? This is because the 
journalist decided to offload responsibility for fact checking to what they considered to be a 
reasonably reliable software. From this scenario, we see that one benefit of offloading 
responsibility is that it allows the opportunity for humans to increase access to useful information 
(e.g., relatively correct facts) while decreasing the cost of doing so (e.g., time spent fact-
checking). Yet, if we consider the adaptiveness of the human-technology extended organism, we 
see that the ecological strengths and weaknesses of the two constituents threaten efficient 
memory in this scenario. The individual has inferred that it is not necessary for them to fact-
check, and the machine does not have the inferencing abilities to surmount the human’s role. 
There are also several downstream consequences in this scenario. First, we see that 
choosing to rely on the fact checker comes at the expense of the journalist’s fact-checking skill. 
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As mentioned previously, humans have a unique ability to solve complex problems and 
effortlessly draw inferences from data. Offloading the responsibility for this skill to a device not 
only compromises the quality of content, but it restricts future learning of this task. Fact-
checking is an essential skill of journalism. Optimally, the journalist would have appropriate 
knowledge of what the machines was good at (e.g., comparing content from a vast number of 
online sources) and then use fact-checking strategies that were outside the scope of the 
machine’s abilities (e.g., considering the subtext of the article).  
Another downstream consequence is related to the content that is published. When the 
journalist chooses to offload responsibility to the fact-checker, they are publishing content online 
that contributes to a crisis of misinformation. Although the internet contains a record of known 
facts, queries, objects, and writings; it is also a collection of misgivings, biases, secrets, and 
attempts to distort. The proliferation of misleading, oversimplified, or incomplete information 
leaves the extended organism vulnerable to new and unprecedented dangers that threaten the 
successful use of memory. This illuminates another risk of the tradeoff—digital memory does 
not (inherently) hold the types of self-reflective mechanisms that are characteristic of human 
memory for evaluating and reevaluating their progress and for changing their on-going processes 
(Nelson & Narens). In other words, the internet does not seek to establish coherence across its 
body of knowledge and the fact-checking software does not have the ability to reflect upon 
whether it is serving an adaptive role to its human partner. This journalist will likely continue to 
offload this responsibility until a problem arises (e.g., users online point out the poor quality of 
content) that prompts active reflection. 
Scenario #2. Consider the case of a graduate researcher learning to code by analyzing a 
dataset. Their short-term goal is to analyze a dataset using a commonly used programming 
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language for statistical computing. The researcher begins by watching basic tutorials, but does 
not understand how to put together arguments. Therefore, the researcher chooses to search online 
for code that will allow them to easily change variable names and run the necessary analyses on 
their dataset. 
How does this influence (short-term) performance on the task? The researcher is able to 
accomplish their goal of analyzing a dataset. But, there are also some contextual factors relevant 
to the completion of the task. For example, in this scenario the researcher tried learning by 
watching tutorials and when they realized that they still did not know how to analyze their data, 
they chose to search online. This highlights two profitable tradeoffs that are characteristic of this 
extended cognitive system. The first is that an extended cognitive system gives the individual 
access to a vast body of knowledge that can be used to accomplish their cognitive goals. Second, 
this aspect of the extended cognitive system affords users the flexibility to make strategic 
decisions about when and how to accomplish their goals. In this scenario, the researcher made an 
adaptive decision to search the internet by realizing that there is no benefit to trying to learn 
something that they are not going to get at all. Under the time pressure to produce the analysis, 
this may have been a smart decision. 
To understand the downstream consequences of these offloading decisions, we should 
consider the unique context of the researcher. First, we should consider that this is the 
researcher’s first time using this programming language, but also this is a skill they will need to 
develop for future use. Although choosing to find code online may have reflected an adaptive 
decision given their short-term goals, it may have been at the expense of future learning. 
Information that is self-produced is better remembered than information that is presented and 
passively read (Slamecka & Graf, 1978). A more effective decision may have been to integrate 
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internal and external memory processes that focused on ways to access new information (e.g., 
different packages and scripts) while drawing connections between this information and the 
concepts already understood.  
Yet, if we consider downstream consequences from an extended organism perspective, 
we will notice that the reasonable adaptive decision previously mentioned does not strategically 
consider characteristics of their constituents. For example, say that this research is learning the R 
computing environment. A major strength of R is that it has open source capabilities so that users 
can continue to develop and share programs that will accommodate new and complex statistical 
problems in the future (R Core Team, 2018). Another strength of R is its strong community of 
active users who help beginner programmers or academics find a particular package or learn how 
to solve statistical problems. A truly effective researcher would make strategic decisions about 
encoding with consideration of the unique characteristics of their counterpart. Understanding 
how to access this community of active users and how to quickly find useful tools and packages 
are important to consider in the broader context of memory use.  
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Appendix B: Strategic Encoding General Information Questions and Answers (60 items) 
Question Answer 
How many seconds are in a minute? 60 
In what state is the Empire State Building located? New York 
What season comes after Fall? Winter 
Who is credited with writing Romeo and Juliet? Shakespeare 
What color do you get when you mix red and yellow? Orange 
What does the "F" stand for in the law enforcement acronym FBI? Federal 
From what city is the "Red Sox" baseball team? Boston 
What car company produces the Mustang? Ford 
What is the name of the currency used in Japan? Yen 
What is the largest mammal in the world? Blue Whale 
Who was the first man on the moon? Neil Armstrong 
In what time zone is the state of Maine? Eastern 
Who painted the Mona Lisa? Leonardo da Vinci 
What is the name of the longest river in the world? Amazon 
In which US city is Hollywood located? Los Angeles 
In what country did the Olympic Games originate? Greece 
Who directed the movie Titanic? James Cameron 
How many days are there in April? 30 
What is the name of the highest mountain in the world? Everest 
What currency is used in Germany? Euro 
What is a baby kangaroo called? Joey 
Who painted the Sistine Chapel? Michelangelo 
What is the capital of Alaska? Juneau 
What is the smallest state in the USA (in terms of land area)? Rhode Island 
Who wrote the horror book The Shining? Stephen King 
What is the capital of Australia? Canberra 
In what US city were the 2002 winter Olympics held? Salt Lake City 
What is the most spoken language on Earth? Chinese 
What is the capital of California? Sacramento 
During games, how many basketball players from one team  
    are on the court? 
5 
What is the fastest land animal in the world? Cheetah 
What male athlete has won the most Olympic medals? Michael Phelps 
Who wrote the children's book The Chronicles of Narnia? C.S. Lewis 
What is the capital of Peru? Lima 
What animal represents the astrological sign of Cancer? Crab 
Which US state is called the volunteer state? Tennessee 
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Who directed the film Psycho? Alfred Hitchcock 
Which fast food restaurant chain was established by Ray Kroc? McDonald's 
What animal's diet is made up almost entirely of eucalyptus leaves? Koala 
What number does the roman numeral "C" represent? 100 
In what Colorado town was there a shooting at the opening  
    of The Dark Knight Rises? 
Aurora 
What is the most abundant element in the universe? Hydrogen 
In what language does "obrigado" mean "thank you"? Portuguese 
In which month does the Kentucky Derby take place? May 
What country gave the state of Florida to the US in 1819? Spain 
In US government, what body must pass federal bills before they are 
sent to the president? 
Congress 
Who is the Greek god of the sea? Poseidon 
In what country is Mt. Vesuvius located? Italy 
In what US state was pop star Madonna born? Michigan 
"Lutz" and "Axel" are terms associated with what sport? Figure skating 
What is the capital of Austria? Vienna 
What is the name of the smallest ocean in the world? Arctic Ocean 
What is the profession of Annie Leibovitz? Photographer 
Which game was the computer program "Deep Blue” 
    was programmed to play? 
Chess 
Who has been nominated for the most Oscars? Meryl Streep 
If you were born on May 22nd, what is your Zodiac symbol? Gemini 
What is a baby shark called? Pup 
What is the most populous city in the country of India? New Delhi 
Worldwide, what is the most popular religion? Christianity 
Which US President served the shortest term in office? William Henry Harrison 
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Appendix C: Metacognition General Information Questions and Answers (60 items) 
Question Answer 
In which year were the Olympics first held in the United Kingdom? 1908 
In which year did WWI begin? 1914 
In which year did the United States abolish slavery? 1865 
In which year was the Treaty of Versailles signed? 1919 
In which year was the Eiffel Tower built? 1887 
In which year was Mahatma Gandhi's salt march? 1930 
In which year did the first person land on the moon? 1969 
In which year was Coca Cola founded? 1892 
In which year did the Berlin Wall go up? 1961 
In which year was the first telephone call made? 1876 
In which year was the USSR dissolved? 1991 
In which year did Bill Gates and Paul Allen found the Microsoft corporation? 1975 
In which year did China's population reach 1 billion? 1980 
In which year was Gangnam Style by PSY released? 2012 
In which year did Princess Diana of Wales die? 1997 
In which year was Facebook created? 2004 
In which year was Machu Picchu discovered? 1911 
In which year was Yellow Fever discovered? 1900 
In which year did the partition of India take place? 1947 
In which year was the first dog launched into space? 1957 
In which year was Pepsi founded? 1898 
In which year did the Berlin wall come down? 1990 
In which year was Morse Code invented? 1836 
In which year was the John Hancock Center opened? 1969 
In which year did the British leave Hong Kong? 1997 
In which year did Steve Jobs and Stephen Wozniak found Apple Computers? 1976 
In which year was Call Me Maybe by Carly Rae Jepsen released? 2012 
In which year did Marilyn Monroe die? 1962 
In which year was Google created? 1998 
In which year was the United States affected by Hurricane Katarina? 2005 
In which year did the Euro become the official currency of 12 European countries? 2002 
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In which year did the G-15 Summit end? 1999 
In which year did Sir Winston Churchill die? 1965 
In which year was the first artificial satellite launched by Russia? 1957 
In which year was Alfred Hitchcock’s movie "Psycho" released? 1960 
In which year was the debut of the television show "I Love Lucy"? 1951 
In which year was the founding of IKEA? 1943 
In which year was penicillin discovered? 1928 
In which year was the first radio program broadcast? 1906 
In which year was Twinkie invented? 1930 
In which year was the completion of the Hoover Dam? 1936 
In which year did Joseph Stalin become the leader of the Soviet Union? 1927 
In which year was the Wizard of Oz released? 1939 
In which year did World War II end? 1945 
In which year was DNA discovered? 1953 
In which year did the first McDonald's open? 1955 
In which year was Pac-Man released? 1980 
In which year did Michael Jackson release "Thriller"? 1982 
In which year did Beethoven perform his Fifth Symphony? 1808 
In which year did Jane Austen publish Pride and Prejudice? 1813 
In which year did the British Parliament pass the Great Reform Act? 1832 
In which year did the Battle of the Alamo end? 1836 
In which year did Charles Dickens publish "Oliver Twist"? 1837 
In which year was the Great Exhibition in London, the world's first World Fair? 1851 
In which year was the construction of Big Ben completed? 1859 
In which year did Thomas Edison test his first light bulb? 1878 
In which year did the Moulin Rouge open in Paris? 1889 
In which year did Vincent van Gogh finish painting "Starry Night"? 1889 
In which year was the Chernobyl nuclear accident? 1986 
In which year was the assassination of Abraham Lincoln? 1865 
 
 
